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The reform of the electricity distribution industry has resulted in the national regulator authorities 
moving from Rate of Return (ROR) to Incentive Based Regulation (IBR) quality regulation 
mechanism.  This has influenced the reporting, planning, design, operating and maintenance 
(O&M) philosophy surrounding distribution networks and service delivery to the end customer.  The 
introduction of IBR regulation has created a need to understand how the IBR scheme implemented 
will influence the capital and operating investment decisions.  The aim of the work leading up to 
this thesis has been to develop reliability hurdle rates that include the effect of the IBR scheme 
implemented by the national regulator authority of South Africa.  This will enable the network 
planner to compare the investment decision with the reward / penalty scheme. 
 
The thesis addresses the challenges facing distribution network planning to achieve the 
appropriate (optimal) balance of investment cost vs. reliability levels.  Value Based Reliability 
Planning (VBRP) methodology is an approach to evaluate capital investment decisions by 
quantifying, in economic terms, the benefits of improving reliability (System Average Interruption 
Duration Index (SAIDI) per capital cost required) by comparing different reliability improvement 
alternatives.  This is achieved by relating the investment decision to the reward / penalty scheme 
introduced by National Electricity Regulator for South Africa (NERSA).  To reach this goal this 
thesis derived a reliability hurdle rate by utilising benefit-to-cost analysis principles by considering 
the shape of the reward / penalty scheme.  Furthermore, this necessitates the determination of the 
optimal balance between investment decisions to obtain improvement in the continuity of supply 
indices.  One of the fundamental objectives is therefore to relate the IBR and VBRP in an efficient 
and effective way, that is the aim of the national regulator authority. 
 
A new method to determine a regional and national reliability hurdle rate is proposed by the thesis.  
This is a first step in obtaining an optimal expansion alternative and allows the planner to compare 
the preferred alternative selected against a hurdle rate.  Since the method considers the reward / 
penalty scheme, the thesis first reviews the principles that influence the quality regulation 
mechanisms and the benefit-to-cost analysis techniques.  The second step demonstrates the 
derivation of the reliability hurdle rate utilising the reward / penalty scheme adopted within South 
Africa.  Parameters considered include the number of customers and the interruption indices in 
each region.  The application studies demonstrate the derivation of the regional reliability hurdle 
rate from the six regions within South Africa.  This allows the derivation of regional reliability hurdle 
rate from the different regional reward / penalty schemes.  Finally, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed to understand the influence of different parameters, which will influence the regional 
reliability hurdle rate.  The results from the case studies show that, when NERSA creates the 
reward / penalty scheme, it is crucial that the approved method is applied to determine the shape 
of the scheme implemented, which will allow the derivation of the reliability hurdle rate. 
 
The new method is suitable for implementation where the IBR quality regulation mechanism has 
been adopted by the national electricity authorities.  Furthermore, the reliability hurdle rate derived 
can be used to compare the investment decision against the improvement required in the 
continuity of supply indices.  This ensures the trade-off between the expansion investment and 
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This method involves taking all relevant costs in the life 
of the project, comparing them with the benefits that will 
be accrued from the project over the same period. 
 
Incentive Base Regulation 
The Incentive Based Regulation methodology was 
developed in response to problems encountered with the 
application of the Rate of Return methodology 
internationally.  The IBR methodology puts a cap on the 
utility’s revenue, profits, or price in order to persuade 
management to produce and supply electricity at the 
least cost possible.  IBR as a form of incentive 
mechanism is an extent ion to the minimum standard 
criteria by linking the profit margin with the level of 
quality. 
 
Life Cycle Costing 
Life cycle costing is a process to determine the sum of 
all expenses associated with a product or project, 
including acquisition, installation, operation, 
maintenance, refurbishment, discarding, and disposal 
costs. 
 
Reliability Hurdle Rate 
This is a mechanism derived from the reward / penalty 
scheme proposed by national regulator authority, based 
on the benefit to cost analysis principles.  It enables the 
planner to compare reliability investment against the 
minimum improvement required. 
 
Return of Return 
Rate of Return is more predictable and a guarantees 
returns investment and is a predominant form of cost-
based regulation.  The objective is to ensure that prices 
are set at a level that allows ongoing supply of service 
(including investment) by the utility, but not so high as to 
allow excess profits. 
 
Value Based Reliability 
Planning 
Value Based Reliability Planning (VBRP) methodology 
will evaluate investment decisions by quantifying in 
economic terms the benefits of improving reliability 
(trade-off) by comparing different strengthening 
alternatives. This approach is based on the concept that 
there is a relation between network costs and the level of 
reliability; this is then again associated with a certain 
level of customer benefit.  The aim is to seek a level of 




















AM Asset Management 
BCA Benefit-to-Cost Analysis 
CAIDI Customer Average Interruption Duration Index 
CAPEX Capital Expenses 
CML Customer minutes lost per year (equivalent to SAIDI) 
DME Department of Mineral and Energy 
DSLI Distribution Supply Lost Index 
EDI Electricity Distribution Industry 
ENS Energy Not Supplied 
ESI Electricity Supply Industry 
EWP Energy White Paper 
FSA Field Service Area 
HV 
Nominal voltage levels that are used in power systems for bulk 
transmission of electricity in the range 44 kV < Un < 220 kV. [NRS 048-2] 
IBR Incentive Based Regulation 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LPIF Load Point Interruption Frequency 
LPIT Load Point Interruption Time 
MV 
Nominal voltage levels that lie above low voltage and below high voltage 
in the range 1 kV < Un < 44 kV [NRS 048-2]. 
NERSA National Electricity Regulator for South Africa 
NPV Net Present Value 
O&M Operating and Maintenance 
OPEX Operating Expenses 
QOS Quality of Supply 
RED Regional Electricity Distributor 
RHR Reliability Hurdle Rate 
ROR Rate of Return 
SAIDI System Average Interruption Duration Index 
SAIFI System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
TEIPI hours lost per year, weighted by the installed transformer capacity for MV 






















South Africa faces many challenges in adopting reliability assessment within 
electricity distribution planning [1], [2] & [3].  The basic reliability assessment 
principles have been described by others [4], [5] & [6], but certain aspects need to be 
addressed before implementation of reliability assessment is possible.  This chapter 
provides a general background to the research objective, hypothesis and contribution 
of this thesis. 
 
1.1. Background:  
 
Historically in South Africa, distribution planners selected the most cost-effective 
alternatives based on the network and financial analyses.  Distribution planners 
within Eskom Distribution adopted limited reliability assessments or crude rule-of-
thumb design criteria when evaluating network constraints [1].  A lack of data on 
equipment failure, repair rates and customer interruption costs forced planners 
internationally to adopt deterministic approaches to network planning [7], [8] & [9].  
 
It is imperative to prevent overinvestment, which can lead to excessive capital and 
operating expenses (CAPEX and OPEX respectively).  However, increasing the 
reliability of the supply usually incurs higher total costs for a utility.  Electricity utilities 
constantly try to balance the costs for higher reliability with the price customers are 
prepared to pay to ensure that the investment decisions are prudent.  This can lead 
to difficult managerial decisions at both the planning and operating phases for any 
project required to improve reliability levels [10].  Quantitative reliability analysis is an 
important input to the decision-making process to enhance the asset management 
principles.  
 
The Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI) within South Africa is receiving pressure 
from three stakeholders, viz. customers, the regulatory body and utility management, 
to develop or review the strategies for providing adequate reliability at suitable cost 
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adopt a sound strategy to balance expenditure to ensure the appropriate reliability 
with the allocation of OPEX and CAPEX funding. 
 
Continuity of supply is one of the major factors that drive the customers’ perceptions 
about the efficiency of the utility [14] & [15].  The restructuring of the EDI worldwide 
allowed policymakers to prescribe the reliability or quality aspects concerning service 
delivery to the end user [16].  The need to reduce costs and to satisfy customer 
needs present an interesting planning challenge.  The capital investment, operation 
and maintenance (O&M) decisions must be supported by explicit analysis of this cost 
trade-off [17]. 
 
The trade-off to evaluate different investment alternatives during the planning of a 
project requires the inclusion of a mechanism to select the preferred alternative.  The 
utility needs to develop a hurdle rate for the planner to compare the investment 
decision against a desired reliability improvement required within the region, or 
nationally.  The proposed method is based on principles of benefit-to-cost analysis 
for selecting preferred alternatives.  This method considers the inherent benefit 
derived by the reliability improvement projects (i.e. benefit = reduction in SAIDI). 
 
This thesis deals with issues relating to the regulation of continuity of supply within 
South Africa.  It forms the basis for the creation of the reliability hurdle rate by 
utilising the reward and penalty scheme introduced by the National Energy Regulator 
of South Africa (NERSA) 1.  At this time, expansion decisions are not linked to this 
scheme.  However, NERSA and policy makers generally pursue higher economic 
efficiency, as well as reliability improvement strategies for formulating investment 
decisions within a limited budget.  The national reward / penalty quality regulation 
scheme can be translated into a higher regional reward / penalty scheme to improve 
the decision-making process.  The approaches are similar to those that need to be 
applied by utilities in many countries, so the work should be internationally relevant. 
                                               
1 NER is the regulatory authority over the ESI in South Africa.  It is a statutory body, 
established in terms of the Electricity Act No. 41 of 1987 and amended 1995.  Amongst 
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1.1.1. Electricity Distribution Industry Reform: 
 
There is a process of change within the EDI through “deregulation” [11].  The South 
African government believes that the industry must be restructured to ensure reliable 
and low-cost electricity for domestic and industrial purposes.  The restructuring of the 
Electricity Distribution Industry has resulted in the NERSA proposal to move from 
Rate of Return (ROR) to Incentive Based Regulation (IBR) [12].  This will influence 
the reporting, planning, design and O&M philosophy surrounding distribution 
networks and service delivery to the end user.  IBR was a way to solve some of the 
challenges introduced by the changes processed by government and regulated by 
the NERSA. 
 
The absence of a strategic framework to address reliability investment decisions will 
shape business functions envisaged by government.  A lack (e.g. policy, standardise, 
guidelines, etc) of a strategic framework will be a major obstacle for the 
implementation of reliability assessment within the planning phase of a project. 
 
NERSA’s policy changes are partly due to a lack of investment in electricity 
infrastructure and a reduction in maintenance and refurbishment by existing 
electricity supply authorities (Eskom and municipalities) [13].  At present, NERSA’s 
requirements prescribe minimum quality of supply standards without any incentives 
to encourage utilities to improve reliability levels. 
 
In Europe, the availability of electric energy has long been regarded as a basic 
condition for economic development and prosperity [8].  The regulators within these 
countries are regarded as pioneers in the implementation of quality regulation 
schemes, which have been in place since 1998 (Italy), also replacing rate of return, 
etc [16].  They encourage the utilities to improve performance by means of 
appropriate rewards / penalties. 
 
The introduction of quality mechanism acknowledges the interdependence 
between the three main stakeholders to serve mutual gains.  Closer 
examination will reveal that distributors and customer’s objectives are not 
mutually exclusive, and that cooperative strategic plans can be made to 
ensure value to all parties [8]. 
 
The major concern for regulators worldwide is that utilities can increase profit by 
reducing costs.  This often leads to the reduction of continuity of supply to customers 
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bodies in recent years.  The downside of this approach is the reduction of O&M costs 
to increase profit margins [14] & [16].  This represents a challenge for the regulatory 
bodies in the sense of finding suitable methods to compensate for the effects of cost 
reductions, whilst at the same time maintaining quality of electricity supply.  
 
1.1.2. New Network Planning Problem: 
 
Presently in South Africa (and probably most developing countries) distribution 
planners plan distribution networks to satisfy both the capacity constraints (i.e. 
voltage and thermal limits), and at the same time ensure the viability of the capital 
investment projects.  The introduction of reliability requirements (ensuring 
sustainability of supply) for distribution networks ensure that the reliability constraints 
are addressed during the design and planning phases of projects [1] & [17]. 
 
Once the regulatory framework and strategic intent are established (e.g. distribution 
code, tariff code, change in regulation mechanisms), the application of reliability 
assessment and improvement from the planning arena will be possible.  This will 
provide a foundation upon which standards, methods and guidelines can be 
formulated to facilitate the implementation of Value Based Reliability Planning 
(VBRP) principles.  This will enable the EDI to integrate the needs of the customer, 
the regulator and the management board into the planning process.  Currently all 
expansion projects are evaluated only on network and financial analyses and the 
tariff structure does not support reliability investment.  Billington et al [7] report: 
 
Quantifying to what extent we should improve reliability levels is a challenge 
facing planners: “how much redundancy and at what cost?”  
 
The major components for the implementation of VBRP principles will rest on four 
important cornerstones [1]:  
 
(1) Equipment reliability data (i.e. historical data for the probability of failure and 
duration);  
(2) Customer interruption cost data (i.e. influence/value an interruption has on a 
customer); 
(3) Reliability analysis tool (i.e. tool to apply probabilistic techniques to predict 
the future behaviour) and 
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The demands from stakeholders force distributors to have a sound strategy for 
balancing expenditures with the appropriate levels of reliability.  This encourages 
distributors to reduce costs and at the same time provide the reliability required by 
customers.  Changes in government and regulator policies are needed to ensure the 
appropriate allocation of OPEX and CAPEX to improve reliability of supply to 
customers.  Distribution planners have a major influence on CAPEX.  The allocation 
of capital for networks to accommodate future reliability constraints is important.  
 
1.2. Research Objective: 
 
1.2.1. Scope and Definitions: 
 
The thesis addresses the challenges facing distribution network planning to achieve 
the appropriate (optimal) balance of investment cost vs. reliability levels.  Value 
Based Reliability Planning methodology is an approach to evaluate EDI investment 
decisions by quantifying, in economic terms, the benefits of improving reliability 
(SAIDI per capital cost required) by comparing different reliability improvement 
alternatives.  This is achieved by relating the investment decision to the reward / 
penalty scheme introduced by NERSA. 
 
The requirement is to develop techniques to determine a regional reliability hurdle 
rate by considering the reward / penalty scheme imposed by a national electricity 
regulator within South Africa. 
 
The problem of establishing a reliability hurdle rate is influenced by the input 
parameters to the reward / penalty scheme adopted by the national regulator 
authority.  The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that many different factors 
influence the accuracy of the predicted reliability improvement achieved by the 
investment decision.   
 
Utilising benefit-to-cost analysis techniques will provide the planner with the basis to 
compare the investment decision against a reliability hurdle rate to ensure the 
investment is effective.  Benefit-to-cost analysis techniques will enable the planner to 
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1.2.2. Research Hypothesis: 
 
Based on the apparent need for a new approach to distribution infrastructure 
planning, it is hypothesised that: 
a regional reliability hurdle rate is related to and can be estimated from the national 
reward and penalty scheme introduced by the National Electricity Regulator of South 
Africa, and that the selection of the preferred reliability improvement alternative 
based on the hurdle rate will result in a change of the decision-making process. 
 
1.2.3. Research Method: 
 
The research will focus on the development of regional reliability hurdle rates to compare 
investment alternatives for distribution networks.  This thesis primarily makes use of 
three research methods, namely literature reviews, development of reliability 
decision-making process, and sensitivity analysis to test the influence of the input 
variables on regional reliability hurdle rates. 
 
The following steps are envisaged to test the hypothesis: 
 
• The literature review (in the next two chapters) assesses both the academic and 
non-academic literature.  The academic literature consists mainly of publications 
on the quality regulation issues of the regulatory problem.  The non-academic 
publications include regulatory publications such as electricity laws, consultation 
documents and regulatory decisions. 
• A proposed reliability decision-making process is developed to meet planning and 
design needs for selecting a preferred alternative. 
• The accuracy of the method needs to be tested by using sensitivity analysis. 
• The method needs to be applied to practical networks to establish suitability and 
relevance. 
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1.3. Scientific Contribution: 
 
This thesis will derive a regional reliability hurdle rate from the reward / penalty 
scheme proposed by the national regional regulator within South Africa. 
 
The main contributions in this thesis are summarised within the text below: 
 
• The equations derived provide three important concepts, namely regional funding 
allocation, regional reward / penalty scheme and regional hurdle rate.  They 
provide the foundation for the formulation of a regional reliability hurdle rate.  This 
is achieved by creating a connection between the national reward / penalty 
scheme and regional reward / penalty scheme. 
• The new approach attempts to relate the reward / penalty scheme to a Reliability 
Hurdle Rate (RHR) that defines the benefits to improve the continuity of supply 
within each region. 
• The thesis will also illustrate the influence of the reward / penalty scheme using 
sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the influence of different input variables. 
 
These methods proposed would be applicable for any national electricity regulator 
using a reward / penalty scheme.  
 
1.4. Outline of the Thesis: 
 
Apart from the introduction and conclusions, the thesis is divided into two main parts.  
Chapters two and three provide foundations for the development of the reliability 
hurdle rate.  The main output of this part is an analysis of the complexities involved in 
reliability economics as applied to the planning decisions.  Chapter four proposes a 
reliability decision-making process to select the preferred alternative.  The factors 
discussed in chapters two and three will form the foundation for the development of a 
regional reward / penalty scheme.  This is further developed in order to estimate the 
reliability hurdle rate and is analysed to determine the influence of the input 
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Chapter two:  Quality Regulation – The strategic intent is defined by the national 
electricity regulator’s decision to monitor the quality mechanism prescribed within the 
licensee conditions.  This chapter discusses the different quality mechanisms 
proposed by national electricity regulators worldwide and the challenges facing the 
national electricity regulator of South Africa. 
 
Chapter three:  Project Evaluation – The evaluation of the different alternatives 
investigated by a planner is validated by the financial and economic worth of an 
investment decision.  Most of the literature ignores the influence of scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance costs.  It normally assumes a fixed percentage related to 
the capital cost.  This chapter further explores the application of benefit-to-cost 
analysis and the main principles for life cycle costing methodology. 
 
Chapter four:  Reliability Decision-Making Process – This chapter provides an 
overview of the proposed reliability decision-making process to identify networks that 
require investment within Southern Africa.  The approach identifies which distribution 
networks require investment to improve reliability in support of national reliability 
targets and incentives.  This will enable the planner to compare the reliability 
improvements to select the preferred alternative.  
 
Chapter five:  Development of Regional Reliability Hurdle Rate – This chapter 
proposes a technique to develop regional reliability hurdle rates based on various 
factors.  It further explores the influence of these factors using sensitivity analysis. 
 
Chapter six:  Assessing the hypothesis – The chapter provides a brief summary of 
the findings and assessment of the research hypothesis.  It also provides a summary 
of proposed further research required to remove the uncertainties of certain input 
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This chapter aims to provide the foundation for development of reliability hurdle rate 
based on incentive-based regulation schemes proposed by the national electricity 
authority within South Africa.  However, before doing so, it is useful to study the 
different quality regulation mechanisms introduced by national electricity regulatory 
worldwide.  Chapters 3 and 4 look more closely at the other aspects to influence the 
development of the regional reliability hurdle rate.  Before doing so, however, this 
chapter first reviews the theory underlying quality regulation and discusses the 
characteristics of the reward / penalty scheme.  In addition, the last few sections 




The Chairman, Dr Ian C McRae  of NERSA stated within the 1996 Annual Report:  
"The only way of ascertaining whether an ESI is performing well, is by asking the 
right questions, obtaining accurate relevant data, setting benchmarks/standards and 
measuring the performance of the respective suppliers against these.” 
 
 
The purpose of quality regulation is to ensure that the public and private electricity 
utilities become more efficient [18] & [19].  National regulatory authorities have 
different regulatory mechanisms to shape the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI).  The 
major concern for national regulators is that utilities can increase profit by reducing 
operating and capital investment costs, which will contribute to the decline in quality 
and continuity of supply.  The absence of incentive-based regulation may result into 
sub-optimum quality of supply [18], [19], [20] and [21].  In addition, the national 
regulator authorities have to provide adequate economic incentives for the 
maintenance and construction of the necessary network infrastructure [20].  
 
In most European countries, a quality regulation mechanism is in place or is in the 
process of being established [19], [21] & [22].  There can be severe financial 
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(e.g. typical 2 to 4%) can be at risk based on the quality of supply received by the 
end customers’ [19]. 
 
2.1.2. Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter two starts by looking at the definition of quality of electricity as applied by 
electricity regulators worldwide to monitor and control ESI.  It also discusses the 
method used to control price of electricity through a quality regulation mechanism.  It 
further focuses on the characteristics related to reward / penalty schemes.  It also 
exposes the problems encountered in implementing these quality regulation 
mechanisms within South Africa and it discusses problems that may be encountered 
in setting a reward / penalty scheme. Finally, it concludes by identify that will 
influence the decision-making process for investment decision for planners. 
 
2.2. Regulatory Mechanisms: 
 
The concern with ROR regulation is that it does not encourage utility companies to 
improve efficiency.  Consequently, utilities are monitored to ensure that investment 
and operating expenses improve the overall continuity of supply to the end 
customers.  ROR does not encourage distribution companies to prevent over-
investment that will lead to sub-optimum levels concerning quality and efficiency. 
 
National Regulatory authorities’ regimes therefore focus on preventing these types of 
inefficiencies and avoiding excessive investments [21].  Simple types of cap 
regulation, on the other hand, may allow a regulated company to reduce its cost by 
reducing its quality of supply, or by cutting investments, maintenance or personnel 
with the aim of increasing its profits.  Consequently, price regulation may thus also 
provide incentives for under-investment into infrastructure to ensure sustainability. 
 
The European countries are seen as pioneers within the field of quality regulation 
[18].  These different quality regulation mechanisms have influenced the philosophies 
adopted by distribution planners for investment decisions.  A number of European 
utilities have changed their allocation of funding to ensure financial viability and to 
achieve the improvement in overall reliability level to the end customers.  The 
regulator mechanisms minimise CAPEX and OPEX expenditure by optimising socio-
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2.2.1. Why do we need quality regulation? 
 
The overall challenge for the regulator is to balance the mismatch between 
expectations and perceived quality of service and to establish a “system” to 
distinguish between the two [23].  At some point, there will be an optimal trade-off 
between the costs and benefits.  The trade-off investment decision should occur 
where the marginal benefits of quality are equal to marginal costs of delivery [24], 
[25] and [26]. 
 
Utilities increasing profit by reduce costs, represents an interesting challenge for the 
national regulatory bodies to find a suitable method to compensate for the effects of 
cost reductions. 
 
In addition, the regulator has to provide adequate economic incentives for the 
maintenance and construction of the necessary network infrastructure.   
 
2.2.2. What is quality in electricity networks? 
 
Quality issues within special reference [27] to European regulators indicate that 
quality of supply regulation should focus on four dimensions of service quality, which 
are: 
 
a) Power quality 
Power quality is related to voltage waveform quality and deals with disturbance 
experienced within networks.  In South Africa, the minimum waveform quality is 
prescribed by the national standard: NRS 048-2 [28].  The principle adopted in 
NRS 048 is to set voltage compatibility levels, based on 95 % probability levels for 
the upper limit of system disturbance levels. 
 
b) Commercial quality 
This describes the interaction between customer and utility that may drive the 
perception of the efficiency of the utility.  This involves issues such as the connection 
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c) Continuity of supply 
A sustained interruption is a planned or unplanned event experienced by the 
network.  It is a measure of the capability of the network to sustain the power flow 
within the network to meet the demand of the customer.  Electric power system 
reliability can be subdivided into two categories, namely adequacy and security [29].  
Adequacy relates to network integrity (e.g. voltage, thermal rating and fault level 
constraints) under steady-state conditions influenced by the demand requirement of 
existing and future customers.  Security focuses on the influence of disturbances 
(e.g. fault) or the recovering of the network within dynamic and transient conditions. 
 
d) Price Regulation: 
In general, price quality regulation considers the mismatch that occurs between the 
cost incurred for electricity delivered and the perceived worth of electricity by the 
customer.  This concept is important to ensure that the utility is able to recoup the 
investment required for future infrastructure and optimal profit margin for investors. 
 
2.3. Method for Price Regulation 
 
Regulatory control has three fundamental aspects, namely cost-based, incentive-
based (US call it performance-based) and marketing-based.  The characteristics of 
these price regulation mechanisms are highlighted in Table 1, namely cost-based or 
rate of return, performance or incentive-based and market-based. 




(e.g. Rate of return) 
Incentive-based 
(e.g. Price caps) 
Market based 
(e.g. Auctions) 
Incentives Regulation Mixed Market Forces 
Market Pure Monopoly Oligopoly Pure Competition 
Price Elasticity Inelastic Unitary Elastic 
Regulatory Role Fix Revenues & Expenses Fix Rules & Prices Monitor & Antitrust 
 
In cost-based ROR, quality is a fixed constraint, a threshold.  In incentive based 
regulation, quality is a variable to which price is linked by a formula.  In market based 
regulation, quality is a variable to which price is sensitive, but quantifying the 


















Rate of return or cost-based regulation is a more predictable (i.e. investor is 
guarantee returns) regulation mechanism, which provides sustainability of the 
electricity sector and comfort for investors.  This mechanism enables decisions to be 
made that are aimed at economic profitability.  This is achieved by annual price 
reviews to ensure that the utility recoups funding to sustain the operating and capital 















































































Figure 1: Annual price review 
 
Rate of Return is based on the following principles to allow recovery of capital and 
operating expenses of the utility via electricity pricing.  The electricity price increase 
should be sufficient to assure confidence in the soundness of the utility.  This is 
sufficient to maintain a credit rating that will allow the utility to raise capital [29].   
 
South Africa utility Eskom provides NERSA with the revenue requirements based on 
equation (1), which incorporates a rate of return that will enable the recovering of 
cost to operate the business and earn a reasonable return.  The required revenue 
requirement based on the financial statement is scrutinised by NERSA.  The average 
price increase guarantees a sufficient capital recovery to meet the revenue 
requirement.  The rules applied are set out in [31]. 
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Where:  
R  =  the required revenue of the regulated entity 
E  =  the operating expenses  
V  =  the value of the qualifying property, plant and equipment 
d  =  the accumulated depreciation on qualifying property, plant and  
  equipment 
w  =  the allowance for working capital held by the regulated entity 
r  =  the calculated rate of return using the weighted average cost of capital 
  (WACC) 
 
The primary problem with a ROR regulatory system is the lack of incentive to 
improve efficiency, which may result in a utility increasing its costs and passing them 
on to consumers without diminishing its profits.  A utility can earn even larger returns 


















The national regulators worldwide have recognised the problem with rate of return 
regulation mechanism.  The majority of the national electricity regulators within 
Europe have adopted an alternative mechanism to introduce incentives to increase 
efficiency.  IBR can be grouped into three regulation mechanism categories [32], [33] 
& [34] , namely  
 
Incentive-based:  IBR has a common goal of linking tariff to quality.  This form of 
regulating scheme allows the regulator to establish a reward / penalty scheme to 
encourage utilities to optimise existing asset and manage risk. 
 
Yardstick: The regulator should have information systems to manage the target-
setting process.  This enables the regulator to set regional targets and provide price 
adjustments based on the variation from the target prescribed by the regulator. 
 
Price cap:   This regulator mechanism is mainly influenced by the tariff structure, 
which encourages maximisation of energy utilisation to increase sales. 
 
This thesis discusses estimation of a reliability hurdle rate based on the reward / 
penalty mechanism proposed by NERSA.  IBR is sometimes referred to as 
performance-based regulation, or CPI-X regulation, within the US.  In this process, as 
illustrated by Figure 2, the tariff increase is not reviewed every year and the next tariff 
increase is estimated after 5 years.  This is based on a productivity or efficiency 
factor that is derived from the performance of the network.  These incentives are 
likely to influence a utility’s behaviour and thereby the potential affected customers.  
This behaviour consists of an operating and maintenance regime, or capital 
investment, to improve the existing and future asset base.  The principal equation (2) 






































































Figure 2: Initial price review for 5-year period 
 
Rt = Rt-1 ([1+ (I – X)] + Z ± K) (2) 
 
Where:  
Rt  =  the required revenue of the regulated entity in the current year 
Rt-1 =  the required revenue of the regulated entity in the previous year 
I  =  an inflation index 
X  =  a productivity or efficiency factor 
Z =  adjustments for unforeseen events or defined pass-through items; and 
K =  adjustments for under or over-recovery against the previous year’s 
ceiling 
 
The principle of IBR mechanisms is to mimic competition within the ESI [34][74].  In a 
competitive environment, utilities are constantly seeking to maximise profits by 
reducing capital and operating costs.  These cost reductions should however, not be 
incurred at the expense of customer or network performances. 
 
Certain developed countries have a high level of adequacy and will not require major 
investments to improve continuity of supply.  In developing countries, such as South 
Africa, however, the investment and refurbishment of assets are low (based on age 
profile vs investment) and greater investment is required to improve adequacy of the 
networks [1] & [2]. 
2.3.3. Market-based: 
 
A competitive market uses intelligence, expertise, and enthusiasm of consumers and 
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ensure that resources are allocated efficiently and effectively.  The results are lower 
prices, improved quality and an increased rate of innovation. 




The reward / penalty scheme was implemented in European countries to ensure that 
the continuity of supply indices improve to an acceptable level as prescribed by the 
national regulators [18], [19], & [22].  These continuity of supply indices normally 
address system averages or worst served consumers by the introduction of 
guaranteed standards on duration and number of long interruptions (i.e. SAIDI or 
SAIFI).  Five out of eight European national regulators require the distribution utilities 
to improve the continuity of supply indices.  As far as the distribution and service is 
concerned, reward / penalty schemes are in place in eight countries out of 19 
surveyed by the Council of European Energy Regulators [19].  In Europe, most of the 
regulators have implemented an IBR quality regulation mechanism from the year 
2000, as illustrated by Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Summary of regulatory mechanism and implementation date [19] 
No Country Year Regulator Mechanism (and period) 
1 Italy 2000 AEEG Quality-dependent price cap (2000 – 2003) 
2 Austria 2000 ESC Quality-dependent price cap (2000 – 2005) 
3 Norway 2001 NVE Quality-dependent revenue cap (2001 – 2006) 
4 UK 2002 OFGEM Quality-dependent revenue cap (2002 – 2005) 
5 Hungary 2003 Minister Quality-dependent price cap (2003 – 2005) 
6 Portugal 2003 ERSE No predetermined duration 
7 Sweden 2004 STEM No predetermined duration 
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2.4.2. Characteristics of Reward / penalty scheme: 
 
a) Shape : 
 
Graphically, the shape of the reward / penalty scheme links the performance of the 
network with a financial impact (either a reward or penalty).  The x-axis represents 
the measured continuity of supply index prescribed by the national regulatory body 
and the y-axis the reward or penalty for not achieving the decided performance.  The 
national regulator can implement a symmetrical or asymmetrical scheme to regulate 
the utility.  As illustrated in Figure 3, the symmetrical scheme can include or exclude 
a dead band and may have a stepped dead band [35] & [36].  The national regulator 
can decide to implement a larger gradient for the reward / penalty region of the 
scheme. 
 
(a ) S ym m e tr ic a l – n o  d e a d  b a n d                     (b ) S ym m e tr ic a l w ith  d e a d  b a n d
(c ) S ym m e tr ic a l w ith  s te p p e d  d e a d  b a n d                     (b ) A s ym m e tr ic a l w ith  d e a d  b a n d
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Figure 3: Examples of Reward / penalty scheme [35] 
 
Figure 4; illustrates the reward / penalty scheme introduced by the National Electricity 
Regulator of South Africa for the period of April 2006 to April 2009 [35] & [36].  The 
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Figure 4: Reward / penalty scheme proposed by NERSA [36] 
b) Target performance: 
 
The national electricity regulator negotiates a target performance, normally based on 
the historical performance for the overall network.  Countries such as Italy have set 
regional targets to ensure that the different regions move toward one target nationally 
[21] and [34].  This is in contradiction to the theory that indicates that the 
environmental and geographical location of the network have a large influence on the 
network performance.  The shape of the reward / penalty scheme is derived around 
the target performance. 
 
c) Performance index:  
 
The majority of the national regulators worldwide have selected one of the continuity 
indices such as SAIDI to measure efficiency.  Table 3 provides a review of the 
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Table 3: Summary of regulatory index 
No Country Continuity of Supply Indices 
1 Italy SAIDI 
2 Spain TEIPI and NIEPI 
3 Norway ENS 
4 UK SAIDI and SAIFI 
5 Hungary Outage rate, faults/km, avg repair time, avg number of grouped faults (LV), SAIDI and SAIFI 
6 Portugal ENS 
7 Sweden SAIDI and SAIFI 
8 Ireland SAIDI, SAIFI and losses 
Note:  Energy Not Supplied (ENS), which is determined based on TEIPI (indicator of 
frequency of interruption weighted with the installed power in MW).  CI: Customer interruption 
per year (equivalent to SAIFI, System Average Interruption Frequency Index).  CML: 
Customer minutes lost per year (equivalent to SAIDI, System Average Interruption Duration 
Index). 
 
5 out of 8 countries have selected SAIDI as a continuity of supply mechanism to 
regulate the distribution companies.  SAIDI and SAIFI consider each customer equal, 
regardless of the size of the customer.  The Cigré 2002 Paris Session Special Report 
illustrated that there is a relationship between customer satisfaction and SAIDI, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.  Indices based on sustained (planned or unplanned) 
interruption are preferred as a guide to regulate supply companies.  On the other 
hand, short-term interruptions (e.g. power quality aspects: dips) are becoming 
important, because customers are becoming more sensitive to these occurrences 
[14]. 
 
SAIDI has been shown to have a strong correlation with customer perceptions in 
other countries where regulators have initiated interruption performance 
improvements [15].  It is therefore commonly chosen as the “broad-brush” index to 
achieve initial improvements and to indirectly quantify customer satisfaction to the 
interruption performance levels [35]. 
SAIDI (Hours/Year)
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It is clear if we compare Figure 4 and Figure 5 that interruptions in South Africa are 
longer than those experienced within Europe.  This is largely due to a lack of 
investment and maintenance on MV networks within South Africa [13]. 
 
Other national regulators (i.e. Norway and Spain) have chosen energy indices such 
as expected ENS as measure of the customer interruption cost due to interruption 
experienced by the customers [19]. 
 
d) Dead Band: 
 
The introduction of a dead band reduces the administration burden placed on 
national regulators with the implementation of the reward / penalty scheme.  This is 
to accommodate the random nature of the continuity of supply indices of networks.  
Three (Italy, Portugal, and Hungary) out of the seven European countries have 
selected dead band within the reward / penalty scheme, as indicated by Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Summary of Dead Band [19] 
No Country Dead Band 
1 Italy Yes: +/- 5 % from target 
2 Norway No 
3 UK No 
4 Hungary Yes: 5% for penalties and 10% for rewards  
5 Portugal Yes: +/- 12% from target 
6 Sweden No: Target varied from year to year 
7 Ireland No: Yearly decreasing of target 
 
In Norway the regulator, whose aim is to achieve a socio-economically acceptable 
level of continuity and not necessarily to improve it, requires no improvement.  
However, the regulator does not want to introduce changes in tariff unless long-term 
changes in continuity of supply indices have not been achieved. 
 
e) Claw back unspent reliability funding:  
 
Reward / penalty schemes, in one form or another, affect revenues earned by supply 
companies.  The reward and penalty achieved is limited to ± 3 % (e.g. UK) of price 
control revenue exposed to performance of the utility [19].  On the other hand, 
countries such as Norway have no limit related to reward and penalty achieved.  
Some regulators would want to avoid any changes in tariff structure due to 
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2.4.3. Reward / penalty scheme adopted by Portuguese Regulator: 
 
This section illustrates the regulatory mechanisms adopted within Portugal [16][19].  
The national regulator (ERSE) has established a reward / penalty scheme to 
encourage distribution utilities to improve continuity of supply to the end user.  This 
scheme affects the annual adjustment of the allowed revenue for the activity on MV 
networks.  Portuguese regulators compare the current continuity indicators (Energy 
Not Supplied (ENS)) with the predefined target.  The reward / penalty scheme 




Figure 6: Portuguese Incentive Scheme [19]  
 
The reward / penalty scheme adopted is symmetrical and continuity indicator is ENS.  
In Figure 6 , the X-axis is related to the current ENS and the Y-axis represents the 
revenue adjustment required to the next regulator period.  The reference continuity 
indicator (denoted by ENSRef) is the negotiated target.  The dead band adopted 
allows for the influencing of seasonal changes without influence the revenue. 
 
• If the value of ENS in a given year is less than ENSRef - ∆ V, which means that the 
network has a good performance, the distributors’ revenue are increased by an 
amount RQS (revenues for quality of supply), expressed in €. RQS is computed 
using a per-unit-value of the ENS, VENS and is proportional to the difference 
between the actual ENS in the year and the target ENSRef - ∆ V: 
 
 
RQS = VENS x [(ENSRef - ∆ V)-ENS] (3) 
 
 
• If the value of ENS in a given year is near the ENSRef value, the distributor’s 
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If: 
 
ENSRef - ∆ V ≤ ENS ≥ ENSRef + ∆ V, then RQS = 0 
 
 




Continuity of supply for distribution networks has always been a concern for 
numerous stakeholders within South Africa [13].  Reliability of supply is one of the 
major factors that drives the perception and expectation of the customers about the 
efficiency of the utilities.  The restructuring of the EDI within South Africa will 
influence the reporting, planning and design philosophy of distribution networks [11] 
& [12].  In addition, the future incentive regulatory mechanisms (introduced April 
2006) will influence capital, operating and maintenance expenses after the 
establishment of the Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs). 
 
2.5.2. Regional Electricity Distributors: 
 
The worldwide restructuring of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) started in the 
early 1990’s.  This revolution of the ESI can also be contributed to new pressures 
from global markets and government opening up the country to foreign investors with 
the view to the expansion of the infrastructure.  Furthermore, the recent issue of the 
Energy White Paper (EWP) set an important milestone in the direction for the ESI in 
SA.  The restructuring of Eskom will be done in terms of Government Policy or 
rationalisation of State-owned assets [11]. 
 
The traditional vertically integrated Electricity Supply Industry structure consisting of 
Generation, Transmission and Distribution is operating as three different business 
entities under Eskom.  The municipalities have also restructured by amalgamating 
different smaller and larger municipalities into larger metropolises.  This has assisted 
a municipality to remain an electricity authority even within the new proposed system 
of Regional Electricity Distributors.  The vision of government is the 
amalgamating/consolidating Eskom Distribution and the numerous municipalities into 
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Objectives of the South African Energy White Paper [11] were to: 
 
• Improve social equity by specifically addressing the energy requirements of the 
poor; 
• Enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of the South African economy by 
providing low-cost and high quality energy inputs to industrial, mining and other 
sectors; and  
• Achieve environmental sustainability in both the short and long-term usage of our 
natural resources 
 
2.5.3. Future Regulatory mechanism: 
 
The move from the ROR to IBR mechanism will change the shape of the EDI [12].  In 
addition, the development of the Distribution Network Code will prescribe the 
boundaries or rules for distribution utilities.  There is a move from a financial to a 
least cost, socio-economic methodology for investment decisions within the 
Distribution Network Code. 
 
This will require distribution utilities within South Africa to apply reliability assessment 
techniques to influence short- to long-term investment decisions.  This will also 
ensure the move from a utility to a customer focus to improve the continuity and 
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2.5.4. Regulatory Period: 
 
The reliability improvement initiatives should be driven in a holistic manner to ensure 
long-term sustainability.  Reliability improvement strategies can be applied to short (1 
to +/- 2 years), medium (2 to +/- 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) programmes.  
These time lines will focus the direction for CAPEX and OPEX reliability decisions [1] 
and [2].  This is an interesting challenge due to the lack of systems and data to 
support regulatory decisions.  Standardisation on monitoring, reporting and systems 
is imperative for development within the REDs to ensure effect monitoring. 
 
2.5.5. Distribution Association: 
 
Norwegian and Swedish distribution utilities and regulators have formed an 
association to discuss the implementation of quality regulatory mechanisms [1].  The 
association issues information on aspects such as component reliability data, 
customer interruption cost and reporting parameters.  This makes evaluation of the 
reliability improvement initiatives easier.  All electricity distribution utilities make use 
of these parameters to ensure that all utilities use the same basis for evaluation.  It is 
not the objective of the association to provide 100% correct values, but to validate 
assumptions that will be used by the whole of the electricity distribution industry.  The 
formation of an industry association for reliability aspects is a reality for South Africa 
in the future, even under the formation of the REDs’. 
 
2.5.6. Electricity Price: 
 
In certain countries, the regulators should address future network investments in 
order to avoid quality degradation and ensure financial viability.  Electricity prices 
may increase (even under cap regulation) as a result of a low starting level, as in the 
South African case.  There may be cross subsidies between different customer 
categories and the customer may not be paying cost-reflective tariffs. 
  
The main difficulties in applying this scheme are that many different factors influence 
costs and performance.  For example, the costs to deliver equal levels of reliability in 
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Price and quality of supply is imperative under incentive regulation mechanisms.  
This incentive regulation, by capping income, will have a profound influence on the 
utilities or REDs in future.  Electricity price control has numerous factors, but the 
main issues are to set initial price, adjusting price to limit revenue gain and ensure 
that efficiency is maintained.  The electrification cost per connection target will also 
have to increase because the majority of the outstanding customers are located 
further away from the existing grid.  This will have to be discussed with the 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), who subsidises these projects.  The 
operational cost is also likely to increase due to increasing customer numbers and 
network size.   
 
The majority of the electrification customers will be connected to poor performing 
networks, which will deteriorate the presenting performance.  Currently planning and 
design philosophies for Eskom Distribution do not provide any guidance to the 
limiting of the number of customers to MV feeders or substations.  At this stage 
Eskom Distribution is planning to connect additional customers (mainly electrification 
customers) to feeders with already a large number of customers (e.g. 17 000).  The 
nominator for SAIDI is the number of affected customer hour impacted by an 
interruption.  The connection of more customers to MV feeder, substation and sub-
transmission feeder will result into an increase in the overall SAIDI for the network. 
 
2.5.7. Electrification: 
President Thabo Mbeki Presidential Address, 2004: "Through our integrated system 
of government, with a strengthened local government working with our state 
enterprise, Eskom, we will, within the next eight years, ensure that each household 
has access to electricity.” 
 
DME estimates that 3,4 million households currently remain to be electrified [37].  
DME, municipalities and Eskom are in the process of developing strategies to ensure 
that SA realises universal access to electrical energy. 
 
South Africa is sparsely populated and electrification of deep rural communities 
presents an interesting challenge for the EDI.  There are various aspects that the 
new regulatory mechanism needs to ensure that the distribution companies have a 
customer focus. 
• It is very difficult to factor aspects such as political weight associated with the 
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• Electrification only caters for low-consumption customers, so the design 
requirement is based on the bare minimum capacity for supplying electricity to 
these communities. 
• The conflict between connecting more customers, reducing cost per connection, 
and providing a more reliable network solution is a challenge for the regulator.  
 
The direction of the reliability-improvement strategies is only possible by estimating a 


















Development reliability framework: The NERSA and stakeholders should ensure 
that the evolution of the ESI would provide a better quality of service to the customer.  
The need to establish new reliability policy for regulating the unbundled network 
functions, in the restructured ESI and the dissatisfaction with traditional quality 
regulation mechanism have led national regulators to adopt schemes such as price 
or revenue caps.  These schemes provide strong incentives for efficiency, thus 
making inclusion of quality (and particularly reliability) regulation elements imperative. 
 
Tariff needs to align with reliability improvement strategy:  The challenge facing 
the ESI in SA is to quantify investment decision to improve reliability, to ensure 
network integrity and viability of reliability improvement projects.  A conflict exists 
between providing a low price for electricity and providing cost reflective tariffs.  The 
removal of cross subsidisation will result in an increase in cost-reflective tariffs.  It is 
evident from the CEER regulatory benchmark report 2005 that many of the regulatory 
bodies do not have the authority to remove the subsidies. 
 
Ensure the balance between OPEX and CAPEX funding:  The regulator should 
provide adequate economic incentives for the maintenance and planning of the 
existing and future network infrastructure.  Incentive-based regulation mimics an 
environment for competition within the Electricity Distribution Industry.  A mismatch is 
created by the continuous decrease of variable cost (OPEX and CAPEX) to reduce 
electricity price.  This behaviour does not encourage the distributor to invest in 
maintenance and refurbishment, nor future infrastructure.  The experience from 
utilities worldwide is that minimal optimisation techniques are always used.  The 
quality regulation mechanisms introduced will influence the business principles. 
 
Setting regional reliability hurdle rates: Finally, linking the planner’s investment 
decision to the reward / penalty scheme proposed by the national electricity regulator 
will assist the decision-making process of the planner.  This is achieved by the 
development of a regional reliability hurdle rate against which a planner is able to 
compare if the investment decision is prudent. 
 
Value-based reliability planning principles supports IBR:  As discussed before, 
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Theoretically, it is impossible to reach 100 percent reliability, since the electricity 
network consists of individual components that all exhibit stochastic failure.  The 
capital cost to improve reliability increases, as higher reliability levels are required.  
 
Economic theory implies that the optimal point of reliability is reached when the 
marginal costs and benefits of reliability are the same [38] and [39].  Figure 7 
illustrates the balance between marginal benefit and cost to improve reliability.  The 
selection of the investment alternative attempts to trade-off the customer cost of 
interruption against the utility cost to provide an improved reliability level. 
 








Figure 7 : Balance between marginal benefit and cost to improve reliability 
 
2.7. The Way Forward 
This chapter dealt with the quality regulation aspects that shape the investment 
decision-making process for OPEX and CAPEX.  In the next chapter, the investment 
decision process for CAPEX investment is explored and, more especially, focus is on 
the application of benefit-to-cost analysis techniques.  This methodology serves as a 














- 38 - 
 





The Eskom Distribution Network Planning investment decision was concerned with 
the optimisation of network configuration to obtain the least-cost solution for existing 
and future load connected.  The change drivers within the EDI (e.g. regulatory 
mechanism “IBR”, Distribution Code and Tariff Code”) are imposing a change in the 
evaluation of investment decisions [40] - [42].  This is supported by the Distribution 
drive to incorporate life cycle cost principles into the investment decisions.  The 






• Licensee Requirements 
• Safety 
• Political influence 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the different project evaluation techniques 




The current financial model within Eskom Distribution will always theoretically ensure 
that the investment is financially viable, based on forecasted load and considering 
the long-run marginal cost of generation [44] - [46].  This may understate the impact 
of the continuity of supply benefits which is especially true when the initial load 
connected is small, but the number of customers connected may have a large 
contribution to the overall continuity of supply.  This poses an interesting challenge 
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Every planning scenario has a mixture of these constraints plus some unique 
constraints related to the geographical influence.  The relative importance or area of 
influence of these constraints will affect the future financial modelling to motivate the 
CAPEX projects for future and existing networks. 
 
Network Planning mainly strives to answer the following questions [43]: 
 
• When should plant be installed? 
• Where should plant be installed? 
• What type of plant should be installed? 
• What size of plant should be installed? 
 
The total investment cost can be minimised using VBRP principles, where the total 
cost is the sum of the utility and customer costs are miniminised [47] and [48].  
Eskom stakeholders (e.g. NERSA and customers) demand a sound strategy for 
minimising costs and optimising reliability [40] - [42]. 
 
A good rule-of-thumb is that sustaining costs can vary between twice and 20 times 
the initial costs [49].  Similarly, once a project choice has been made for reliability 
improvement, up to 65% of the total LCC have been committed, even though only 

















Figure 8: Reliability improvement opportunities [50] 
 
3.1.2. Chapter Outline 
Chapter 3 starts by glancing at the main financial and economic techniques utilized 
by planners to evaluate alternatives for investment decisions.  It further discusses 
Planning         Design         Construction     Operations      Disposal 
Opportunities to 
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two main techniques, namely benefit-to-cost analysis and least life-cycle costing 
principles.  It then considers the modification to the benefit-to-cost principles to 
incorporate reliability improvement achieved by different investment decisions.  
Finally, the last section concludes with the different decision criteria utilised to select 
the preferred alternative. 
3.2. Financial and Economic Analysis 
 
The economic analysis assesses an investment project from the national viewpoint, 
whereas the financial analysis assesses the project from the viewpoint of the utility 
[51] - [52].  The selection of the most desirable investment alternative is determined 
by using the financial and economic indicators to evaluate the investment projects 
[53].  These indicators are only a tool to aid the analysis of investment projects [54] 
and selection of the preferred project.  This is generally required to ensure that 
prudent investment criteria are adhered to (further discussed in last section 3.5). 
 
The present Financial Evaluation Model (FEM) primarily (broad overview provided in 
Appendix A) computes the present value for a future net cash flow, minus the initial 
investment cost [46].  The income is discounted to determine the present value of the 
cash flow.  The present values for each year of the investment project are 
determined based on the tariff breakdown for the overall connected load.  It also 
roughly estimates the cost of the O&M of the project, which is defined by the R/kVA 
for the load connected [45].  These costs are derived by considering the total OPEX 
cost and proportional allocated cost per load size. 
 
3.2.1. Project Evaluation Indicators: 
 
It is important to remember that there is probably more than one correct project 
evaluation indicator available [53] when evaluating different investment projects.  
After evaluating the different alternatives, the planner desires to determine the 
viability of the preferred investment decision.  This therefore means that there must 
be some way of comparing alternatives against one another [53]. 
 
The planners can utilise either financial or economical project evaluation indicators, 
or a combination of both.  Some risk analysis can be applied and some decision-
making process can be followed to ensure that the risk is minimised, if not eliminated, 
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The preferred project is commissioned long after the capital outlay was made, the 
time value of money becomes a crucial factor in the consideration.  The time value of 
money principle recognises the fact that money has a value, which is related to time.  
The existence of interest and inflation reduce the value of money over time [43].  The 
cost of capital and time value of money concepts therefore become fundamental in 
the evaluation of projects 
 
Table 5: Time value indicator 
Time Value of Money 
 
n




There are a number of ways of evaluating whether or not a project is worth 
undertaking from a financial analysis point of view [43].  The four most commonly - 
used methods are the least-cost solution, the net present value, the internal rate of 
return and the discounted payback period. 
 
Table 6: Financial project evaluation indicators: 










































Discounted Payback Period 
 CIF
COF
PP =  (7) 
 
There are a number of ways of evaluating whether or not a project is worth 
undertaking from an economic analysis point of view [52].  The four most commonly - 
used methods are the benefit-to-cost analysis, profitability index, return on 














- 42 - 
 





































































ARR =  
 
(11) 










r =  Annual interest rate 
m =  Number of payment periods per year 
FV =  Amount of money that will have accrued by a certain date emanating 
  from an earlier investment or series of investments. 
PV = Original investment (principal sum) 
r = Interest rate 
Ct  = Net cash flow at time t “cash inflow” 
I = Cost of the investment “cost outflow” 
k = Cost of capital 
r  = Internal rate of return 
CIF = Cost Inflows 
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3.3. Benefit-to-cost Analysis: 
 
The purpose of Benefit-to-cost Analysis (BCA) is precisely to ensure that limited 
resources (e.g. reliability improvement funding) are used to their best advantage in 
terms of meeting specific predetermined objectives (e.g. improvement of regional and 
national continuity of supply indices).  This method of comparing the costs against 
the benefits of a project has led to a relatively well-developed theory for project 
appraisal known as benefit-to-cost analysis [56] & [57].  A common term also used is 
"bang-per-buck" factor.  It expresses the result of a trade-off analysis, which identifies 
the most cost-effective solution of those available.  Accepting the least LCC 
alternative without considering the benefit achieved is a major risk when evaluating 
investment projects.  
 
The BCA principle enables the planner to reject or accept reliability improvement 
projects.  Figure 9 illustrates the principle for selecting the preferred alternative based 
on the BCA.  Project X and Z generated a benefit-to-cost a value of less than 1 and 
the only prudent project is project Y. 
 
 
Figure 9: Benefit-to-cost Principle 
 
In principle, BCA can be a unit-less ratio when the nominator and denominator have 
the same units.  The BCA can also produce a useful index to compare the benefit vs 
energy usage (R/kWh).  If we consider the SAIDI improvement/LCC, the incremental 
Reject Region 
B/C < 1 
Acceptance Region 
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capital cost required to achieve the reliability improvement aims to maximise the 
benefit, which will be further explored in section 3.4.  This method involves taking all 
relevant costs in the life of the project or asset (considering life cycle costing) and 
comparing them with the benefits (e.g. SAIDI improvement). 
 
In certain applications a ratio is utilised, which defines the ratio of the present value 
of the benefits to the present value of the costs.  In effect, BCA can be expressed as 
a discounted benefit per rand of the discounted cost.  This process involves deflating 
costs and benefits to the present value, which ignores the income derived from the 
investment decision. 
 
The final stage of the reliability decision-making process (discussed in chapter 4) is 
the selection of the preferred alternative and comparing it with the reliability hurdle 
rate.  Chapter 5 will discuss utilising BCA with the objective to improve overall 
continuity of supply in relation to the IBR scheme.   
 
3.3.1. Type of Benefit-to-cost Analysis: 
 
The two most approaches to compute the benefit-to-cost analysis are known as [76]: 
• Conventional BCA 
• Modified BCA 
 
1. Conventional BCA: 
 
The net benefit is divided by the net cost for the investment project.  This is 















A reduction of cost or an improvement can be considered as a benefit.  The trade-off 
is expressed in equation (14): 
 
 
fpn UUU −=  
 
(14) 
Typical investment projects are evaluated to the reduce owner’s costs or improve the 
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capital and maintenance costs.  Maintenance cost is the function of the scheduled 
and unscheduled maintenance regime, which is expressed in equation (15). 
 
)intint( nnnnn enanceMadUnscheduleenanceMaScheduledCMC ++=+  (15) 
 
Thus, if we include maintenance cost as a cost the BCA equation, it can be 










Income is normally excluded from the BCA equation during the evaluation of projects.  
Normally income is common to all alternatives considered.  Thus, if we include 

















pU  = Present benefit 
fU  = Future benefit 
pI  = Present Income 
fI  = Future Income 
fM  = Future O&M 
PM  = Present O&M 
fC  = Future Capital Cost 
pC  = Present Capital Cost 
 
2. Modified BCA: 
 
The net operating and maintenance costs are treated as negative benefits rather 
















BCA studies, by their very nature usually involve a comparison of two or more 
alternatives against base case “do-nothing”.  The principle difference in conventional 
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Thus, when the benefit is zero the results are zero, which does not represent the 
reality.  In the numerator, any net increase in benefit (or decrease in cost) is positive, 
and in the denominator, any net increase in cost is positive.  The modified BCA 
enable the project to be motivated, by a saving achieved in operating and 
maintenance cost. 
 
3.3.2. BCA Applied within Reliability Evaluation: 
3.3.2.1. Implied Cost 
An alternative method for evaluating a cost-to-benefit value has received 
considerable attention in the UK [29].  This is known as “implied cost per kWh 










aC  = capital cost for reinforcement  
mC  = annual costs of operation, maintenance and other services 
sC  = annual savings associated with any reduction in electrical system losses or 
generation costs 
E∆  = reduction in ‘energy not supplied’ in the first year resulting from the 
investment 
 
3.3.2.2. Adding Wind Turbine Generators (WTG) 
The reliability worth of adding WTG as an alternative supply can be represented by 
an index designed as the wind generation interruption energy benefit (WGIEB) [58].  











EENSaw and EENSbw = energy not supplied after and before adding WTG units 
 
The reliability worth to adding WTG can also be represented by an index designated 
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Where: 
ECOSTaw and ECOSTbw = expected interruption cost after and before  
     adding WTG units 
 
These indices provide direct reliability benefit indicators on the addition of WTG and 
are important information for planners making decisions such as the size and number 
of WTG. 
 
3.3.2.3. Project approval process 
Deregulation is forcing utilities to optimise budgets and to ensure that reliability 
improves.  It has become necessary to establish accept/reject criteria that best 
allocate budgets and obtain the highest reliability level of the utility networks.  The 
method formulated a project approval process utilising a cost/benefit principles.  The 
Budget Constrained Planning (BCP) process fixes the budget and projects compete 
against each other for approval before funding is depleted.  
 
BCP can be formulated as the following optimise budget constraint problem: 
 
Maximize: 
Benefit (P)   P = [p1, p2, …, pn] 
 
Benefit is a function of the project alternatives that require approved. 
 
Subject to: 
Cost (P) ≤ Budget 
(B/C)i ≥ (B/C)max  i = [1 …n] 
(∆B/∆C)i ≥ (∆B/∆C)max   i = [1 …n] 
 
Where: 
n = number of projects considered 
C = cost for the project 
B = benefit derived with investment project 
 
This project formulation ensures that the utility chooses projects so that it maximises 
benefit without going over budget.  Furthermore, it prevents approving projects that is 
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3.3.3. BCA Applied within Reliability Evaluation: 
 
The reliability worth to improve the overall system continuity of supply indices can be 
represented by an index designated as the SAIDI benefit-to-cost (SAIDIBCA). 
 


























SAIDIbase case  = System average interruption duration indice for base case  
SAIDIalt = System average interruption duration indice alternative  
   considered 
IC  = Initial investment cost 
RC  = Recurring cost 
NRC  =  Non-recurring cost 
p  = Discount rate 
n  = Equipment lifetime 
3.4. Life Cycle Costing: 
Life cycle costs (LCC) analysis sums up all cost categories, from installation to 
decommissioning when evaluating the different investment alternatives [59] - [66].  
During the life span of a project, the initial investment cost in certain scenarios can be 
a fraction of the total cost.  
 
The overall objective of LCC analysis is to determine the long-term costs associated 
with the investment decision in order to “buy right rather than buy cheaper”.  Figure 
10 illustrates that the cost over the life span of the project will vary depending on the 
alternative selected.  The capital cost of alternative 2 is more than alternative 1, but 
the life-cycle cost analysis indicated that alternative 2 is the preferred long-term 
investment decision.  Note that the total project costs should be related to current 
costs, this is achieved by using Net Present Value (NPV) calculations.  
 
 
Figure 10: Possible cost element breakdown for two alternative projects. 
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Life cycle costing adds a long-term financial perspective and provides the means to 
[59]:  
• predict financial performance through life on a quantitative basis; 
• assess the financial implications of the contributions made by other functions and 
• compare alternative options on a common financial basis. 
 
Some literature [59] - [66] has established a generic LCC model, which is utilised to 
estimate the total project cost.  Applying LCC techniques improves the accuracy of 
the estimation of the total cost of the alternatives.  This improves the estimation of 
total cost denoted within the denominator of the BCA equation.  It is crucial that we 
understand the availability of the input parameters to these LCC models.  The LCC 
estimation model is the sum of all the cost associated with the equipment or network 
over its life span.  The general LCC estimation models are presented in the equation 
(23) below. 
 
LCC = RC + NRC (23)  
 
Where: 
RC = recurring cost 
NRC = non-recurring cost 
 
In turn, RC (also known as sustaining) has five major components: maintenance 
cost, operating cost, support cost, labour cost and inventory cost.  Similarly, the 
elements of the NRC (also known as acquisition) are procurement cost, training cost, 
LCC management cost, support cost, transportation cost, research and development 
cost, test equipment cost, equipment qualification approval cost, installation cost and 
reliability and maintainability improvement cost. 
 
If we discount the RC and NRC, we can express the LCC equation as: 
 






















IC = Initial cost 
p = Discount rate 
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3.4.1. Cost Categories / Elements 
The philosophy behind VBRP is to minimise total cost to society, i.e. not only the 
utility [47].  The typical cost categories utilised by electricity authorities for project 
evaluation are: 
 
1. Capital cost for network planning alternatives, 
2. Technical and non-technical losses, which include: 
a. Resistive losses in the network (load losses); 
b. Cost of lost load (lost revenue); 
c. Customer Interruption Cost; 
d. Electricity theft; 
e. Aesthetic values (e.g. property values) and 
f. Perceived safety to public and employees. 
3. Operation and maintenance costs (O&M). 
Preventative and corrective maintenance costs may include stand-by, call-out 
and reparation costs. 
4. A technical measure of the reliability, i.e. index or indices that accurately reflects 
reliability of the network. 
 
If at this point only load and energy are considered, then the total annual cost (Ct) is 
given by [29]: 
 





i = ith customer or load point 
cli = Cost to customer per kW of load discounted 
cci = Cost to customer per kWh not supplied 
cri = Loss of revenue per kWh not supplied 
λi = Failure rate 
Li =  Load disconnected 
Ei = Energy not supplied 
Cr = Reinforcement annualised investment charges 
Cm = Increase in annualised maintenance charges 
Cs = Increase in annualised cost of system losses 
 
Two main cost categories for costs incurred over the life span of the assets/project, 
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1. Acquisition costs: 
 
These costs are associated with the procurement and/or creation of the asset.  
Acquisition cost is further sub-divided into three cost elements, namely research and 
development, non-recurring investment costs and recurring investment costs.  The 
main goal of these steps in terms of an electricity utility is to ensure that continuity of 
supply and integrity of the network is maintained for the future load growth. 
 
2. Sustaining costs: 
 
These costs are associated with the running and/or operation of the asset as well as 
the decommissioning at the end of its useful life.  Operational costs are both 
scheduled/unscheduled maintenance and other operating costs to ensure the 
equipment performs its task, as it was intended to perform.  Decommissioning costs 
include expenses for safe disposal of the asset as well as taking into account other 
legal and economic features. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates generic cost categories and elements [49]. 
 
 
Figure 11: Main cost categories 
 
Some of the cost categories and elements discussed in the previous section may not 
be available for incorporation into the model, due to a lack of data.  The complexity of 
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excluded.  Also, note that the same cost categories and elements may be the same, 
or vastly depending on the alternative evaluated.  The cost elements illustrated in the 
flow diagram in section 3.4.2 are discussed below: 
 
A. Estimated initial and future energy losses:  
 
Technical losses are a function of the type of customers and network characteristics 
(e.g. voltage, load profile, power factor, etc.).  It is directly proportional to the 
resistance and temperature of the network and is given by I2R.  In transformer no-
load losses are not proportional to the load.  This results in heat dissipation into the 
environment. 
 
Costs of losses should be considered as outflows of capital in determining the 
preferred alternative.  The energy (kWh) losses are related to the marginal cost to 
generate electricity.  Secondly, increasing peak loading will result into an increase in 
demand charge. 
 
B. Estimated customer interruption costs:   
 
Interruptions of electricity supply to the customer inherently results in an economic 
impact to customers, the severity of which usually depends on the duration of the 
interruption [38][47].  The customer costs of interruptions can be estimated using 
equation (26) : 
 
ECOST = EENS*CIC (26) 
 
Where: 
ECOST  =  expected cost to customers due to all expected interruptions 
EENS = expected energy not served (kW expected to be lost) 
CIC = customer interruption costs, usually given in R/kWh 
 
C.  Estimated capital cost:  
 
Capital cost generally consists of the procurement cost of the material/equipment, 
handling, transportation, construction, protection, control plant, commissioning, 
research and development, overheads and labour. 
 
D.  Estimated schedule/preventative maintenance costs for each year:  
 
These are recurring costs and are generally associated with operating and 
maintenance, labour, inspection etc.  Depending on the alternative selected, the 
maintenance costs will vary due to the maintenance interval or equipment and spares 
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different maintenance philosophies, which may increase (or decrease) the life span 
of certain components with different cost impacts. 
 
The formula for average annual preventative maintenance man-hours (PMM) is as 
follows [61]: 
 




PMM  = is the average annual man-hour cost for preventative  
   maintenance. 
Man-hours = number of man-hours required to perform the preventive  
   maintenance routine 
 
E.  Estimated unscheduled/corrective maintenance costs for each year:   
 
These recurring costs may vary considerably from year to year, depending on the 
number and severity of failures at the asset.  It includes factors such as labour 
(normal, overtime and stand-by), materials and travel costs associated with the repair 
of the asset and restoration of supply. 
 
The formula for average annual corrective maintenance man-hours (CMM) is as 
follows [61]: 
 
CMM = λ * 8760 * MTTR * A * M (28) 
Where: 
CMM  = The average annual man-hour cost for corrective  
   maintenance. 
λ  = Total failure rate as number of failures per hour.  This includes 
   all failures.  (Equals 1/Mean Time between Failures). 
8760  = Number of hours in a year. 
MTTR  = Mean Time To Repair.  The time in hours it takes to repair the 
   faulty item back to operating condition. 
A  = The number of men required to do the work.  This also  
   includes the safety aspect. 
M  = Man-hour rate. 
 
F.  Estimated energy delivered to customers for each year:   
 
The additional energy utilisation is computed to determine the future revenue income.  
If existing energy delivery may be lost if the project is not approved, existing energy 
utilisation should also be included here.  With the capital costs, the expected return 
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G.  Estimate decommissioning cost:   
 
In most scenarios, this aspect can be ignored due to the following reasons: 
1. The expected value for the disposal of the different alternative projects is very 
similar. 
2. The book value of all assets should be zero, due to tax depreciation over the life 
span of the asset. 
 
3.4.2. Project evaluation process 
 
The Eskom policy [42] states, “The economic evaluation of investments affecting the 
reliability of supply will take into account the cost to the customer of unsupplied 
energy, and its probability of occurrence” and applies to Generation, Transmission 
and Distribution.  This policy implies that alternative selection and project evaluation 
must be performed for the majority of projects using an economic evaluation (since 
most projects have reliability implications). 
 
The workflow in Figure 12  illustrates the cost elements, which includes the total 
costs rather than only the initial capital cost for the investment project.  This is 
evident as the cost of losses, interruptions, scheduled and unscheduled O&M and 
disposal costs may exceed the initial investment cost.  Adopting a LCC approach will 
enable the planner to perform an economic comparison to select the minimum total 
cost based on acquisition and sustaining costs.   
 
After the planner has identified the different investment alternatives, the total cost of 
all alternatives should be calculated based on the life span of the project.  This also 
requires consideration of how and when costs occur during the life cycle of the 
project. 
 
Two aspects that may be critical in an Eskom Distribution implementation are not 
included in the process of Figure 12 , namely: 
 
1. Regulatory aspects such as IBR: 
 
Possible penalties or rewards may be impacted by a specific project or set of 
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2. The potential change in revenue: 
 
Previous tariff increases were based on a rate-of-return, which were calculated on 
the value of the approved asset base.  However, the IBR scheme adopted by 
NERSA allows the regulator to influence profit margin. 
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3.5. Establishment of decision criteria 
 
There are usually more projects than available resources (especially budget, labour, 
and materials).  This competition for resources often means that projects need to be 
evaluated against each other and they must be prioritised using a certain criteria [53]. 
 
Once a preferred investment project has been selected, there is a further 
complication in that there are usually more ways than one of addressing a particular 
need.  The two main methods of selecting the preferred investment project are by 
quantitative and qualitative analysis [47].  Financial and economically evaluating the 
investment alternatives provide some kind of way of comparing alternatives against 
one another.  The project evaluation indicators discussed in section 3.2.1 provide a 
quantitative manner to evaluate the investment projects. 
 
However, it will never capture all the constraints highlighted and therefore it is 
imperative that a qualitative analysis is performed.  Thus, the decision-making 
process will overall influence the selection and prioritisation of the investment 
decision.  The challenge is determining which combination of alternatives to select 
will optimise the investment decision. 
 
The project evaluation model decided by utilities can be categorised into three main 
evaluation criteria: 
 
• Business impact : This estimates the rate of return for the investment in capital. 
• Project evaluation:  This estimates the inherent difference between the 
alternatives considered. 
• Economic impact:  This estimates the socio-economic benefits derived by the 
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These decision-making criteria as illustrated in Table 8, can be further segmented 
into indices to describe the worth of the projects evaluated. 
 
Table 8: Evaluation indices for different project 
 
Project evaluation indices Business impact indices Economic impact indices 
Life-cycle cost NPV Benefit-to-cost analysis  
Benefit-to-cost analysis  IRR EIRR 
  PI   
  Payback period   
  Break-even    
 
It can be noted in Table 8, that project evaluation indices ignores the income stream 
and only considers the benefits derived.  The minimum evaluation criteria for each 
alternative evaluation are described in Table 9.  This allows the decision-maker to 
accept or reject the alternative presented [55]. 
 
Table 9: Minimum Evaluation Criteria 
Evaluation criteria  Economic measure  
Payback period Payback period < Life span of project 
Net present value Net present value > 0 
Internal rate of return IRR > Discount rate 
Life-cycle cost Lowest total cost of all alternatives 



















This section has provided an overview of the different project appraisal techniques 
available to evaluate or compare the different investment projects against each other.  
As previously stated, there is probably more than one correct project appraisal 
technique.  The most commonly used techniques have been presented in this 
chapter.  It was also highlighted that these project-evaluation indicators are utilised to 
select the preferred alternative. 
 
A move from ROR to IBR within the EDI would require the evaluation of project be 
justified only if the overall benefits to the customers are higher than the costs.  Under 
the current project evaluation techniques utilised by Eskom Distribution, the selection 
of a preferred alternative is problematic.  This is due to the investment project 
considered is not adding any additional capacity.  Indeed, as section 3.3.2 has 
shown, the application of BCA to evaluate the projects may result in an overall 
improvement in reliability. 
 
Special attention has been given to the different BCA evaluation techniques and was 
extended to focus on LCC principles.  These techniques will be utilized to evaluate 
reliability improvement projects.  Due to the fact that the budget will always be 
limited, projects compete for the resources (e.g. money, labour, material, etc).  In this 
chapter certain project decision-making criteria have been documented to accept or 
reject projects.  At the same time it provides a quantifiable measure for making long-
term, cost-effective decisions, but it will not replace good engineering judgement.  
We can then conclude in proposing a modified indicator (SAIDIBCA) we are able to 
evaluate reliability improvement projects.   
 
 
3.7. The Way Forward 
 
This chapter dealt with the project evaluation techniques, which assist the planner to 
select the preferred investment alternative.  In the next chapter, the reliability 
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This chapter describes a proposed reliability decision-making process to identify 
networks that require investment within Eskom Distribution.  The approach identifies 
which distribution networks require investment to improve reliability in support of 
national reliability targets.  This will enable the planner to compare the reliability 





A number of publications consider customer interruption costs as a selection criterion 
[67] - [71].  This thesis focuses on the application of Benefit-to-cost analysis (BCA) 
for distribution networks when performing comparative analysis on the different 
network reliability improvement alternatives evaluated by the network planner [56] 
[58].  The lack of credible data concerning loading, load forecasting, equipment 
failure rate, repair rate and customer interruption cost has hindered engineers in 
making decisions based on the EENS index for Eskom Distribution [73].  
 
This section will further highlight the steps required to make a decision concerning 
which is the preferred alternative.  The steps to evaluate reliability improvement 
alternatives are as follows: 
 
1. Identify networks for reliability improvement 
2. Ranking networks 
3. Reliability assessment 
4. Perform Benefit-to-cost analysis 
5. Compare with network performance target 
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7. Initiate investment projects 
 
This method enhances the comparison of the selected alternatives, which enables 
the prioritisation of alternatives with use of the hurdle rate derived by this thesis.  This 
method considers the inherent benefit derived by the reliability improvement 
alternatives using performance indices (i.e. SAIDI). 
 
4.1.2. Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter four starts by looking at the methodology for the selection of the preferred 
alternative.  It also discusses the method to classify and rank networks to ensure that 
the distribution planner focuses on the correct networks.  It further focuses on 
performing benefit-to-cost analysis to evaluate the benefit (SAIDI) against capital cost 
required.  It also discusses problems encountered utilising customers of interruption 
cost to estimation of the reliability worth.  Finally, it concludes by using the benefit-to-
cost with the regional reliability hurdle rate to accept or reject the project evaluated to 
improve the overall reliability of the network. 
 
4.2. Methodology : 
 
The method is to select networks a planner is able to focus his efforts on, based on 
the historical performance of the network due to the limitation of funding, where the 
investment would provide best benefit for those funds.  Hence ranking alternatives on 
BCA is appropriate with the limitation of budget.  There are other factors, such as 
environmental impact, technical losses, project lead-time, etc.   
 
The relative results of the alternatives are compared with minimum reliability criteria 
prescribed by this Network Planning Reliability Guideline.  This minimum reliability 
criterion serves as a trigger for further investigation of the existing performance and 
network configuration to improve overall reliability.  Figure 14 illustrates the process 
and the main features of this method: identification of networks, reliability 
assessment and the comparative analysis to select the investment alternative to 

































4.  Perform 


















Figure 14: Reliability decision-making process 
 
4.3. Classification of Networks 
 
The critical part of the process is the identification of networks to improve continuity 
of supply.  In stage 2, these networks are analysed in detail, with the purpose of 
ranking the networks based on the reliability criteria 
The classification of MV networks is dependent on the existing performance of these 
networks, as illustrated in Figure 15.  NERSA has decided to introduce SAIDI as a 
quality regulation mechanism for South African utilities [12].  The simplification of 
SAIDI is the multiplication of CAIDI and SAIFI [74].  A scatter plot of these 
performance indices is a representation of SAIDI as illustrated in Figure 15.  CAIDI is 
representative of networks that will require investigation by the planner, because one 
of the major factors that influence the duration of restoration is the configuration of 
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1. Green networks : These networks do not require any investment.  Boundaries are 
defined by regional gatekeepers of 2.5 and 20 for CAIDI and SAIFI respectively, as 
illustrated in Figure 15. 
 
2. Red networks:  These networks require immediate investigation to improve the 
continuity of supply.  The networks are compared to the overall regional target 
defined by a SAIDI of 50 hours. 
 
3. Orange networks: The area between the green and red boundaries will define 




















Figure 15: Classification of networks 
 
HV networks should be classified on the top 40 principle, i.e. the 40 HV networks in a 
Region that have the biggest impact (historical and potential future) on regional 
SAIDI and DSLI (current criteria: substation supplying a customer base greater than 
10 000). 
 
4.4. Ranking Networks 
 
The networks that have been classified are further sorted to rank the importance in 
relationship to their inherent network characteristics (e.g. number of customers per 
network).  The criterion to sort these networks is determined by the planning 
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1. Classification of networks;  
2. Number of customers connected to the feeder or customer contribution to overall 
region; 
3. If network exceeds the regional performance target; 
4. Total line length of the network. 
 
4.5. Reliability Assessment 
 
The third stage is the evaluation of different network alternatives by performing 
reliability assessment.  Reliability assessment enables an engineer to transform 
knowledge of network (λ - failures/yr and r – hrs/failure) into a “prediction” of its likely 
future behaviour, based on different network configuration alternatives evaluated by 
the planner [9].  A quantitative reliability analysis is an important input parameter to 
improve the reliability decision-making process for the management of the reliability 
constraints of existing and future networks.  Typical equipment reliability data 
(obtained from published literature) can be used to facilitate the comparative 
analyses between different expansion or design alternatives within the planning 
phase of a project [9], [75].  Figure 16 illustrates steps required to perform a reliability 
assessment on the case study below. 
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Figure 17  illustrates case study results where the relative percentage improvement 
in SAIDI (y-axis on right in relative %) and capital cost (y-axis on left in R millions) 
required to achieve this improvement are represented for different alternatives.  
Alternative 6 is initially the preferred alternative, because it achieves the largest 
improvement of almost 19% from base case.  The selection of the preferred 
alternative is not obvious, as other considerations such as capital cost have not yet 
been included.  The technique to select the preferred alternative is based on benefit-
to-cost analysis and will be discussed further in the next stage of the reliability 











































Figure 17: Reliability assessment of alternatives 
 
4.6. Perform Benefit-to-cost Analysis 
 
Finally, in the last stage of the reliability decision-making process, is the selection of 
the preferred alternative based on the BCA and comparative analysis.  This is a 
commonly - used method of estimating the relative benefit based on the incremental 
capital cost required to improve the continuity of supply.  Unlike Expected Cost 
(ECOST) estimation of reliability worth, BCA is concerned with the relative 
improvement in SAIDI of the different expansion alternatives, and not the customer 




BCA =  (29) 
 
The BCA principle enables the planner to reject or accept reliability improvement 
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budgets due to budget constraints [69] & [71].  It is clear from Figure 18 that, when 
considering the benefits and capital cost required, alternative 6 is not the preferred 





















Figure 18: Benefit-to-cost Analysis 
 
4.7. Compare results with target: 
 
Figure 19 represents a bar chart with the improvement achieved by the configuration 
alternatives and the line chart represents the benefit-to-cost analysis results.  
Comparing the improvement with the desired improvement required for the network 
is important in order to align with national targets.  Thus, a qualitative analysis of the 
pros and cons may result in the selection of alternatives, which do not have a high 
BCA, but have a higher SAIDI improvement.  Figure 19 illustrates that alternative 3, 4 
and 6 are desirable when considering the reliability improvement target and benefit-
to-cost analysis.  The selection technique finally indicates that alternative 4 is rather 


















































Figure 19: Improvement vs BCA against target improvement 
 
4.8. Compare results with hurdle rate 
 
As the accuracy of the failure rate and customer interruption cost improve, the 
introduction a FSA, regional and national hurdle rate is possible.  This final step is to 
compare the selected alternatives against the single or reward and penalty reliability 
hurdle rate.  The estimation of the hurdle rate is based on the BCA principle.  This 
provides the planner with a single SAIDI/Rand hurdle rate against which to evaluate 
alternatives.  If consider Table 14 the single or reward and penalty reliability hurdle 
rate for Region 1, 2.44 and 1.63 min/R/a respectively.  Consider Figure 19, 
alternative 2, 3, 4 and 6 achieve the decided hurdle, which will exclude alternative 1 
and 5. 
 
It is important to translate the reward / penalty scheme introduced by NERSA into a 
single reliability hurdle rate (m RHR) to which the planner is able to compare the 
investment.  When we consider the symmetrical nature of the scheme, we are able to 
derive the straight line (y = f(x)) required to reduce the scheme into a single m RHR for 









































Figure 20:  Reliability hurdle rate 
 
This single reliability hurdle rate (m RHR) represents an alternative that results in an 
improvement in a regional and national SAIDI.  However, if the reward / penalty 
scheme is asymmetrical in shape, more consideration must be given to the derivation 
of the single reliability hurdle rate.  Expressing in symbolic form, we can consider the 















It seems reasonable to suppose that if x5 (SAIDI) were to be improved to x1 then 
expression (30), will achieve a maximum reward for the investment decision.   
 
The distribution planning core objective is to determine the reliability level (based on 
customer and network types) for which a planner should plan a distribution network 
to improve reliability on a system level.  The application of VBRP principles clarify 
certain aspects required to make reliability-based decisions during the planning and 
design phase of strengthening project [9].  This thesis will discuss the derivation of 


















This chapter has presented a method for the prioritisation and selection of the 
preferred alternative for reliability assessment in support of national reliability targets 
and reward / penalty schemes.  The method has been applied to a case study which 
demonstrated that, when comparing alternatives against certain criteria, the preferred 
alternative is not obvious. 
 
The proposed reliability decision-making method assists determining which 
distribution networks require investment.  If a planner is not able to quantify the 
reliability improvement associated with network alternatives, then the selection of the 




4.10. The Way Forward 
 
This chapter dealt with the reliability decision-making process, which provides the 
understanding where the reliability hurdle rate is applied within the planner 
evaluation.  In the next chapter, the thesis discusses the derivation of the reliability 
hurdle rate, utilising benefit-to-cost analysis principles.  This reliability hurdle rate is 
derived from the reward / penalty scheme proposed by NERSA and special focus is 
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The derivation of the Reliability Hurdle Rate (RHR) is based on the IBR which has 
been discussed in chapter 2.  The international trend is that the shape of the reward / 
penalty scheme can be symmetrical or asymmetrical.  A symmetrical scheme allows 
the determination of a measure, which can be utilised to compare the investment 




NERSA has decided to introduce a symmetrical reward / penalty scheme with a dead 
band for South African distributors [12].  The thesis will discuss utilising a 
symmetrical reward / penalty scheme to estimate a regional reliability hurdle rate, 
which allows the planner to compare the reliability improvement projects against the 
hurdle rate.  Figure 21  below is an example of a symmetrical reward / penalty 
scheme, which includes a dead band (B-C and C-D). 
 
 
Figure 21: Reward / penalty scheme (adopted from NERSA: Design of distribution 
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The funding allocation thresholds in Figure 21  define the amount of revenue 
exposed to the reward / penalty scheme introduced by the national regulator.  The 
thresholds have been capped at A and E. 
 
In the case of countries such as Great Britain and Ireland, the funding risk is limited 
to +/-2 to +/-3% of the revenue.  The thresholds for reward (A) and penalty (E) are 
set around the target performance the national regulator would like to achieve 
nationally.  Italy, Hungary and Portugal have defined different dead band values, 
which vary from ±5% to ±12%.  Other countries such as Norway, Sweden, Ireland 
and Great Britain, do not have a dead band [16]. 
 
A reward / penalty scheme within South Africa should be based on the fixed funding 
allocation for all reliability improvement initiatives related to: 
(a) Worst performing networks and  
(b) Continuous improvement for the overall continuity of supply for distribution 
networks. 
 
Funding to improve distribution networks should be different for initiatives (a) and 
(b). The key differences are highlighted in Table 10  below. 
 
Table 10: Differences between reliability improvement initiatives 
Worst performing networks (a) Continuous improvement (b) 
Short-term initiatives Long sustainable initiatives 
Majority of funding allocated to OPEX Majority of funding allocated to CAPEX 
Fixed duration to achieve objective (typical 
2 years) 
Continuous efforts to incorporate 
reliability decision-making within planning 
and design phase of projects 
Utility normally defines a few reliability 
improvement drives 
Selection of projects to improve 
continuity of supply with numerous 
alternatives which will be based on BCA 
 
Continuous reliability improvement funding should be allocated separately from 
normal CAPEX funding to ensure sustainability of the utility network for the existing 
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5.1.2. Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter five starts by looking at the techniques used for allocating funding per 
region, based on national importance.  It then considers a South African scenario and 
derives formulae to determine the shape of the regional reward / penalty scheme and 
allocation of funding.  Section 5.2 discusses the method to derive the regional 
reliability hurdle rate (RHR).  Finally a sensitivity analysis is performed to explore the 




A method to determine a regional and national reliability hurdle rate is proposed by 
this thesis.  This reliability hurdle rate utilizes the reward / penalty scheme adopted 
by NERSA and is based on benefit to cost principles to determine the reliability 
hurdle rate. 
 
Figure 22, presents the different steps followed to determine the reliability hurdle 
rate.  As a first step, it is necessary to obtain the reward / penalty scheme adopted 
the national electricity regulator.  The second step is to estimate the regional reward / 
penalty target for each region.  To derive the regional scheme we require regional 
continuity of supply targets and shape parameters derived from the national reward / 
penalty scheme.  The next stage is to derive the allocation for the regional reliability 
funding by considering the contribution each region has to the overall national 
continuity of supply indices and the national reliability funding.  This provides the 
shape of the regional reward / penalty scheme for each region.  Finally, it would be 
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4.         Regional
Reward/Penalty Scheme
5. Reward or Penalty
Reliability Hurdle Rate
 
Figure 22: Process to estimation reliability hurdle rate 
 
5.2.1.  National Reward / Penalty Scheme: 
The first step in deriving the reliability hurdle rate is to obtain the approved reward / 
penalty scheme adopted by the NERSA as illustrated by Figure 23.  The reward / 
penalty scheme is a quality regulation mechanism utilized within IBR scheme.  This 
mechanism is adopted is to ensure that the public and private electricity utilities 
become more efficient. 
 
National electricity regulator has different regulatory mechanisms to shape the 
Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI).  The majority of the national electricity 
regulators worldwide have selected one of the continuity indices such as SAIDI to 
measure efficiency[16].  Table 3  as illustrated in Chapter 2, provides a review of the 
different continuity of supply indices utilised by the national regulators worldwide. 
 
Graphically, in Figure 23 the shape of the reward / penalty scheme is linked to the 
performance of the network with a financial impact (either a reward or penalty).  The 
x-axis represents the measured continuity of supply index prescribed by the national 
electricity regulator body and the y-axis the reward or penalty for not achieving the 
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Figure 23; illustrates the reward / penalty scheme introduced by the NERSA for the 











ure 23: Reward / penalty scheme proposed by NERSA 
 
5.2.2. Shape of Regional Reward / Penalty Scheme: 
 
The next step is to determine the shape (A, B, C, D and E) of the regional reward / 
penalty scheme adopted within each region, as illustrated in Figure 24.  The y-axis 
defines the penalty or reward achieved after the regulatory period.  The x-axis is the 
continuity of supply prescribed by the national electricity regulator.  The symmetrical 
nature of the reward / penalty scheme is defined by the threshold limits (y1 and y2), 
dead band limits (x2 and x4), target performance value (x3), and threshold clamping 








x1 = x3 – (x3 * c1 %)
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
x5 = x3 + (x3 * c2 %)
x4 = x4 + (x3 * c4 %)x2 = x3 - (x3 * c3 %)
South Africa IBR scheme:
•C1 and C2 are constant at 5% deviation
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Figure 24: Illustration of a symmetrical reward / penalty scheme 
 
In Figure 24, the following points are indicated: 
 
Clamping reliability funding for a reward and penalty (A and E) 
End of dead band for a reward and penalty (B and D) 
Mean value of the SAIDI target per region (C) 
 
In the case of South Africa, the threshold for the dead band is set around the desired 
national performance and is rolled down to the regional level to achieve the overall 
national target.  The estimation of the regional targets is based on the desired 
national performance target and the contribution (actual and potential) each region 
has on the national target. 
 
A fixed deviation from the required target is negotiated with NERSA before the 
implementation of the reward / penalty scheme.  In the South African scenario, a 
fixed percentage of ± 5% were selected for c3 and c4.  The constant deviations 
depicted by c1 and c2 are set at ± 15% from the national target.  
 
The national and regional targets, depicted by x3, are based on a 12-month moving 
average value for SAIDI.  The thresholds for the dead band are depicted by  
 
B x2 = x3 - (x3 * c3) (31) 
   















- 75 - 
 
The clamping limit for the reward / penalty scheme is depicted by: 
 
A x1 = x3 – (x3 * c1) (33) 
   
E x5 = x3 + (x3 * c2) (34) 
 
The resultant shape of the regional reward / penalty scheme is based on the 
symmetrical nature of the national reward / penalty scheme.  As a result, it is possible 
to create a regional reward / penalty scheme after the Performance Department 
derive the regional targets, denoted by C in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 : Regional targets defining the x-axis per region 
A B C D E
15% 5.0% 0% 5.0% 15.0%
Region 1 48.20 53.87 56.7 59.54 65.21
Region 2 22.44 25.08 26.4 27.72 30.36
Region 3 27.54 30.78 32.4 34.02 37.26
Region 4 35.19 39.33 41.4 43.47 47.61
Region 5 67.49 75.43 79.4 83.37 91.31
Region 6 16.41 18.34 19.3 20.27 22.20  
 
5.2.3. Regional Reliability Funding Allocated: 
 
Regional reliability funding is a function of the impact each region has on the overall 
national continuity of supply indices.  The previous step derived the x-axis of the 
regional reward / penalty scheme.  To complete the scheme we need to derive the y-
axis next.  This provides the clamping reliability funding for the reward and penalty for 
achieving improvement or not.  
 
The regional funding allocation (RFA) is based a function of variables which will 
influence the continuity of supply indices for each region, i.e. 
 
RFA is a function of (RCB,%CD,%CI, NFA) (35) 
 
Where: RCB is regional customers base and contribution of each region in relation to 
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consider the funding in relation to the regional and national customer base, the 














Then consider the contribution of each region has in relation to the national impact to 
SAIDI and SAIFI, the regional funding allocated is derived by expression (37) & (38): 
 
RFADi = %CD * NFA (37) 
 
RFAIi = %CI* NFA (38) 
 
Finally, we have derived the regional allocation of reliability improvement funding by 
considering the impact the three variables namely, customer base and the 
contribution to the continuity of supply indices (SAIDI & SAIFI).  We can introduce a 
weight factor to consider focus area for each region.  The overall regional allocation 
















RFA = regional funding allocation 
RFACi = regional funding allocation based on customer numbers 
RFADi = regional funding allocation based on the regional influence on national 
SAIDI  
RFAIi = regional funding allocation based on regional influence on national 
SAIFI  
RCB = regional customer base 
NCB = national customer base 
NFA = national funding allocation 
%CD = % of the regional total number of customer interruption durations 
%CI = % of the regional total customer interruption 
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If we apply the derived formulae to the six regions within South Africa for a national 
funding allocation of R 500 million, we can observe that each region is allocated 
different funding to improve overall reliability of their networks, in proportion to the 
customer numbers and interruption indices.  The regional funding allocated (RFA) 
derived is denoted in Table 12 below.  
 
Table 12 : Reliability Funding Allocation per region 
Customer Base R million % CD R million % CI R million
Region 1 1040451 176R        43% 215R            50% 250R          213R          
Region 2 450338 76R          9% 46R              12% 59R            60R            
Region 3 341713 58R          10% 48R              8% 41R            49R            
Region 4 459001 77R          12% 62R              12% 62R            67R            
Region 5 444140 75R          24% 118R            16% 79R            91R            





5.2.4. Reliability Hurdle Rate: 
 
This proposed method attempts to translate the reward / penalty scheme adopted by 
NERSA into a reliability hurdle rate (m RHR) by which the planner is able to compare 
the investment with the benefits achieved.  For the symmetrical scheme, a straight 
line (y = m1x + c) can be derived, which reduces the scheme to a single reliability 
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In Figure 25, it can be seen that with the symmetrical nature of the reward / penalty 
scheme ensure that m 1and m 2 are parallel with each other.  The gradient (m 1 and m 
2) for the reward BXA 1ˆ  and penalty DXE 5ˆ  region is equal; the error margin 
illustrated by A1 and A2 therefore cancel each other out.  Expression (40) is the slope 
of the angle ERA ˆ  and is equal to the gradient or slope of the curve y = f(x).  This 
single reliability hurdle rate (m RHR) will define the viability of the investment project 
that represents a target improvement in SAIDI from x5 towards x1. 
 





))(()( −−+=  
(40) 
 
It seems reasonable to suppose that if x5 (SAIDI) were to be improved to x1 then 
expression (40) will achieve a maximum reward for the investment decision.  
 
Application of the equation: 
The following procedure can be used to determine the reward / penalty and single 
hurdle rate for each region based on national importance. 
Determine the denominator of expression (41) for the reward (x m1 = x2 – x1) and 















mmθ  (41) 
 
Determine the denominator of expression (41) for the reward (y m1 = AO) and penalty 
(y m2 = RO) region as illustrated in Figure 25. 
 
The single hurdle rate can also be derived using expression (42) by determining the 
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The procedure above was applied to an allocation of R500 million across six regions 
in order to derive the reliability hurdle rate, results are displayed in Table 13 below.  
 
Table 13: Regional reward / penalty scheme to derive reliability hurdle rate 
F G H I J K L M
Reward Reward Penalty ∆ Reward Penalty
Penalty ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
(R million) (E-A) (C-A) (B-A) (E-D) (G/J)* (H/J)* (F/J)*
Region 1 176 17.01 8.51 5.67 5.67 351R             1.94 1.94 2.91
Region 2 76 7.92 3.96 2.64 2.64 152R             2.08 2.08 3.13
Region 3 58 9.72 4.86 3.24 3.24 115R             3.37 3.37 5.06
Region 4 77 12.42 6.21 4.14 4.14 155R             3.21 3.21 4.81
Region 5 75 23.82 11.91 7.94 7.94 150R             6.36 6.36 9.54
Region 6 38 5.79 2.90 1.93 1.93 77R               3.01 3.01 4.51
Reward Reward Penalty ∆ Reward Penalty
Penalty ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
(R million) (E-A) (C-A) (B-A) (E-D) (G/J)* (H/J)* (F/J)*
Region 1 215 17.01 8.51 5.67 5.67 430R             1.58 1.58 2.37
Region 2 46 7.92 3.96 2.64 2.64 92R               3.44 3.44 5.17
Region 3 48 9.72 4.86 3.24 3.24 96R               4.05 4.05 6.08
Region 4 62 12.42 6.21 4.14 4.14 124R             4.01 4.01 6.01
Region 5 118 23.82 11.91 7.94 7.94 236R             4.04 4.04 6.06
Region 6 11 5.79 2.90 1.93 1.93 22R               10.53 10.53 15.79
Reward Reward Penalty ∆ Reward Penalty
Penalty ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
(R million) (E-A) (C-A) (B-A) (E-D) (G/J)* (H/J)* (F/J)*
Region 1 250 17.01 8.51 5.67 5.67 499R             1.36 1.36 2.05
Region 2 59 7.92 3.96 2.64 2.64 118R             2.68 2.68 4.03
Region 3 41 9.72 4.86 3.24 3.24 82R               4.74 4.74 7.11
Region 4 62 12.42 6.21 4.14 4.14 124R             4.01 4.01 6.01
Region 5 79 23.82 11.91 7.94 7.94 158R             6.03 6.03 9.05












It can be observed in Table 13, that the reward and penalty reliability hurdle rate (m 1 
and m2) is equal, represented by column K and L.  The single hurdle rate is higher 
than the reward and penalty hurdle rate and is represented by column M.  To derive 
the overall regional reliability hurdles rate and funding allocation, we considered the 
three variables and applied expression (43) & (44): 
 
5.2.5. Regional Reliability Hurdle Rate: 
 
Finally, it would be possible to derive the regional reliability hurdle rate for each 
region.  This is derived from the shape of the regional reward / penalty scheme and 
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m  m  m
  m CICDCBRRHR  
(43) 
 
Where: mRRHR is regional reliability hurdle rate derived by the reliability hurdle rate 
impact based on the customer based (mCB) and contribution each region has in 
relation to national SAIDI (mCD) and SAIFI (mCI). 
 
To derive the overall regional reliability funding allocated (RRFA) for each region 









R  R  R
  R CICDCBRRFA  
(44) 
 
Where: RRRFA is regional reliability funding allocated derived by the funding allocation 
based on the customer based (RCB) and contribution each region has in relation to 
national SAIDI (RCD) and SAIFI (RCI). 
 
If we apply expression (43) & (44) to the results obtained from Table 13, the overall 
funding allocation and reliability hurdle rates is represented by Table 14.  
 
Table 14: Overall regional reliability hurdle and funding allocation 
Funding Single Reward Penalty
(R million) RRHR RRHR RRHR
Region 1 213.34 2.44 1.63 1.63
Region 2 60.33 4.11 2.74 2.74
Region 3 48.88 6.08 4.05 4.05
Region 4 67.15 5.61 3.74 3.74
Region 5 90.64 8.21 5.48 5.48
Region 6 19.66 12.86 8.58 8.58
6.55 4.37 4.37National Avg
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5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity analyses were carried out in Excel in order to assess the influence of 
various factors, such as dead-band width, clamping limits and funding allocation on 
the reliability hurdle rate.  Variations of the reliability hurdle rate were studied for the 
six regions within Eskom Distribution South Africa.  Three scenarios are presented 
when considering the influence of the characteristic parameters of the reward / 
penalty scheme on the single and reward / penalty hurdle rate. The following 
characteristics were varied within this section: 
 
1. Dead band; 
2. Clamping limits; 
3. Allocation of funding. 
 
5.3.1. Scenario 1- Varying the dead band width 
 
Figure 26 below illustrates the sensitivity of the regional reliability hurdle rate when 
varying the dead band for all six regions within South Africa.  The graph on the left-
hand side illustrates a minimum dead band with a minimum slope where mRHR, m2 and 
m1 are equal.  The area indicated by CXA 1
∧
 and CXE 5ˆ  for the reward and penalty 
areas are equal because the scheme is symmetrical.   
 
The graph on the right illustrates a maximum dead band width with a maximum slope 
where A3 and A4 are zero.  The dead band has no influence on the single reliability 
hurdle rate, but the reward and penalty hurdle rate reaches a maximum when the 
dead band reaches the clamping limits prescribed by A and E, as illustrated in Figure 
26.  If A3 and A4 are supposed to compare to A1 and A2 in Figure 26, then no dead 
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Figure 26: Sensitivity of the dead band on the hurdle rates 
 
In Figure 26 the clamping limits (A and E) are fixed with a 15% variation from the 
target performance prescribed by C.  A decline in the reward / penalty hurdle rate (m 
2 = m 1) can be seen as the variation moves towards the clamping limits (A and E). 
 
Region 6 has the largest hurdle (i.e. 12) for a fixed dead band of 1% and Region 1 
has the smallest hurdle (i.e. 2) for the same variation, as illustrated by the result in 
Figure 27. 
 
Since the dead band does not influence the single reliability hurdle rate (m RHR), the 
effect of the hurdle rate is a function of the variables, such as clamping limits and 
funding allocation.  The influence on hurdle rate will be demonstrated with the next 
scenarios.   
 
Implementing a single hurdle rate for all regions will therefore result in an error with a 
large variation.  The line graph Delta R6 – R1 in Figure 27 illustrates the difference 
between the outlying Region 1 and Region 6. 
 





























Minimum Dead Band  
= Minimum slope 
Maximum Dead Band 
= Maximum slope 
m RHR  = constant 
m 2 = m 1 = maximum 
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Delta R6 - R1
 
Figure 27: Results for the variation of the dead band 
 
5.3.2. Scenario 2 - Varying the clamping limit 
 
Figure 28 illustrates the sensitivity of the regional reliability hurdle rate when varying 
the clamping limit for all six regions within South Africa.  A fixed dead band of 5% 
(A’’’) is applied from the mean performance prescribed by C.   
 
Figure 28 shows how the single reliability hurdle rate increases as the clamping limit 
is varied from A’’’ to A and E’’’ to E. 
 
 
Figure 28: Varying the clamping limits 
 
The results illustrated in Figure 29 show that Region 6 is very sensitive to variation of 
the clamping limits.  The single hurdle rate in Region 6 varies from less than 5 to 
greater than 15 for a variation of 5% to 20% of the clamping limits from the target 
















y Minimum Dead Band = 
Minimum slope 
Maximum Dead Band 
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performance.  On the other hand, Region 1 varies from 0.81 to 3.26 for the same 
variation of the clamping limits. 
 



























Figure 29: Results for varying the clamping limit on the single hurdle rate 
 
The results illustrated in Figure 30 show the variation of the reward and penalty 
hurdle rate, with variation of the clamping limits.  From Figure 30 it is apparent that 
the reward / penalty hurdle rate vary from 0 to 12.86 for Region 6 and Region 1 
varies from 0 to 2.44 for the same variation of the clamping limits (i.e. from 5% to 
20% from the mean performance target).  
 






























Figure 30: Results for varying the clamping limit on the reward / penalty hurdle rate 
 
Figure 31 shows the incremental difference between the outliers (Region 1 and 
Region 6) when the clamping limits are varied for the single hurdle rate.  The 
difference ranges from 4 to 14 as the clamping limit varies in relationship to the target 
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difference when changing the clamping limits from 5% to 20% of the mean 
performance.  
 


























Figure 31 : Results to incremental difference between Region 1 and Region 6  
 
5.3.3. Scenario 3 - Varying the allocation of funding 
 
If we consider the reward / penalty scheme illustrated in Figure 32, varying allocation 
of funding (y1 = y2 = ∆yt) will influence the clamping limits and slope between A and 
E. 
 
Figure 32: Incremental change in hurdle rate with budget increase 
Figure 33 illustrates the sensitivity of the regional reliability hurdle rate when varying 
the allocation of funding towards reliability expenditure for all six regions within South 
Africa.  From Figure 33 it is clear that the Region 1 is strongly influenced by the 
variation in the allocation of the funding, where the variance is smaller for the other 
regions. 























 ∆yt = y1 – (- y2) 
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Figure 33: Funding allocation with increasing budget allocation 
 
In Figure 34 a plot of the sensitivity for all six regions shows the influence of the 
variance of the budget allocation on the single reliability hurdle rate.   
 
















































Figure 34: Single reliability hurdle rate with increasing budget allocation 
 
In Figure 35  it can be seen that, when considering the outliers (namely Region 6 and 
Region 1), the incremental change reaches a saturation point at a funding allocation 
of approximately R550 million and R600 million for a single change and reward / 
penalty reliability hurdle rate respectively.  A variation of less than 1 is defined as the 
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This chapter has outlined the theoretical basis for the estimation of the regional 
single and reward / penalty reliability hurdle rate derived from the national reward / 
penalty scheme introduced by NERSA.  It proved the basis for the comparison of the 
hurdle against the benefit derived by the alternatives evaluated to improve the overall 
reliability of the network identified.  The expression derived was applied to the six 
regions within the Eskom Distribution supply area.  The chapter has discussed the 
related difference between the estimation of reliability worth against benefit-to-cost 
analysis for the evaluation of investment projects.  It is the latter concept that is more 
relevant in the evaluation of reliability improvement projects if we consider the reward 
/ penalty scheme.  Application of the equations proposed in this chapter was utilised 
to derive the reward / penalty scheme for each region.  It further derived the single 
and reward / penalty reliability hurdle rate per region.   
 
The next step is to carry out sensitivity analysis on the shape of the reward / penalty 
scheme to observe the influence on reliability hurdle rate for each region.  The 
variation of the characteristics clearly illustrate that the selection of the parameters 
has a large influence on the reliability hurdle rate per region.  It is observed that the 
variation dead band does not influence the single reliability hurdle rate.  This is not 
observed when the clamping limit was varied, which illustrated the single and reward 
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6. Assessing the hypothesis: 
 
 
This thesis focused on the development of a regional reliability hurdle rate to provide 
decision criteria to accept or reject a proposed investment project to improve overall 
continuity of supply to the end customer.  An important feature of this thesis is that it 
considered the reward and penalty scheme adopted by NERSA to develop a 
reliability hurdle rate.  Traditionally, regulators have provided the electricity utility with 
funding to improve overall continuity of supply but ignored the influence of the 
funding and target required from the investment decision made.  In contrast, this 
thesis focuses on the issues of how to determine the preferred alternative.  It has 
demonstrated by comparing the investment decision against the reliability hurdle rate 
will improve the decision-making process for reliability improvement projects. 
 
The thesis explored the different aspects that will influence the development of the 
reliability hurdle rate.  Chapter two and three provide the foundation of the 
development reliability hurdle rate and serve as the literature chapters.  Chapter two 
centred around the quality regulation techniques adopted by different national 
regulators world wide.  Special attention was given to reward and penalty schemes 
adopted within South Africa.  Chapter three then continued with the project 
evaluation techniques utilised to select the preferred alternatives.  It further 
investigated the use of benefit-to-cost analysis and life cycle costing principles.  This 
is used as basis for the development of SAIDIBCA, which is extended to the reward 
and penalty scheme.  Chapter four proposes a decision-making process to address 
the challenge around selecting the preferred alternative to improve the overall 
continuity of supply indices.  Chapter five develops the reliability hurdle rate and 
demonstrates the calculation based on the six regions within South Africa. 
 
The hypothesis for this thesis was that: 
 
“A regional reliability hurdle rate is related to and can be estimated from the national 
reward and penalty scheme introduced by the National Electricity Regulator of South 
Africa, and that the selection of the preferred reliability improvement alternative 
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The hypothesis had two main parts namely:  
 
a) A regional reliability hurdle rate is related to and can be estimated from the 
national reward and penalty scheme introduced by the National Electricity 
Regulator of South Africa, 
 
Chapter five, clearly demonstrated that it would be possible to derive the regional 
reliability hurdle rate from the national reward / penalty scheme proposed by the 
national electricity authority of South Africa.  The proposed method derived the shape 
of the regional reward / penalty scheme from the contribution of the regional 
performance to the national continuity of supply indices (especially: SAIFI and 
SAIDI).  Added to this is the customer base served by each region, which is used as 
another variable.  These variables are utilised to allocate the funding for each region 
from a fixed national reliability funding.  After the reward / penalty scheme is derived 
for each region the single reliability hurdle rate (mRHR) is estimated from the gradient.  
The regional reliability hurdle rate represents the minimum benefit for the investment 
decision to improve the reliability within each region. 
 
b) that the selection of the preferred reliability improvement alternative based on the 
hurdle rate, will result in a change of the decision-making process 
 
Clearly a key part of the process of investment decision is to consider the proposed 
method to develop a reliability hurdle rate. It can be concluded that it is possible to 
incorporate the reward / penalty scheme into the reliability decision-making process 
discussed in Chapter 4.  This assists with the selection of the preferred alternative to 
improve overall continuity of supply of the network investigated. 
 
Therefore, the hypothesis is valid and flowing from the validity of the hypothesis is a 
method that is appropriate where national electricity regulators have adopted a 
reward and penalty scheme.  The application of this method within South Africa will 
prevent the overinvestment in networks, which does not improve the overall 
continuity of supply of the regional or national indices.  This is achieved by estimating 
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Finally, even though the proposed method determines the regional reliability hurdle 
rate, the lack of detailed analysis in the determination of the reward and penalty 
scheme remains a challenge when certain decisions by the national regulator are not 
supported by any scientific methods.  It is imperative that national regulators ensure 
that the provision of funding and targets are assessed carefully.   
 
The thesis is still valid in context of loadshedding within South Africa because any 
major events and loadshedding is not included in the continuity of supply indices for 
regulating purpose.  Reliability improvement projects on distribution level will not 
assist in the generation shortage experience currently within South Africa. 
 
The validity of the hypothesis indicates that further development of concepts and 
rules is needed for the electricity distribution industry and national regulators. 
 
The work carried out in this thesis serves as a basis for subsequent research within 
the field of the project evaluation process and the reliability decision-making process.  
It is clear that further research is required to remove the uncertainties of certain input 
variables.   
 
Future work includes the following: 
 
• The real cost of interruption is only imperfectly known and the method cannot be 
accurately represent the social and economic impact of interruption.  Better 
customer interruption cost data can be built into model and will affect the 
allocation of funding, presently allocated in proportion to the customer numbers 
and the interruption indices.  
 
• A further study might be required on the development of a method of determining 
the target continuity of supply indices and the shape of the reward and penalty 
scheme adopted by the national regulator authorities, since these do not yet 
appear to be derived rigorously. 
 
• Although the results of the development of the regional reliability hurdle rate so 
far are encouraging, there is still scope for further improvement to investigate the 
development of a reliability hurdle rate for asymmetrical reward and penalty 
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Appendix A: The use of the Financial Evaluation 
Model (FEM) [46] 
 
The introduction of discount cash flow analysis investment techniques some time ago 
did a lot to give credibility to the process of investment analysis.  Investment 
evaluations will have value if the various technical alternatives that are considered, 
are compared to each other over the life-cycle of the project. 
 
The FEM tool is a discounted cash flow application to evaluate investment projects 
within Eskom Distribution (FEM model – Author: Henk Martens).  This is quite a 
complex model and gives a fair representation of the actual application of the various 
tariffs and cost of purchases. 
 
In applying the model, it is necessary to note and to apply the following: 
 
 Life-cycle: The model makes provision for the evaluation of projects over different 
time periods.  The typical life-cycle for new work projects such as a supply to a 
new customer, is 25 years, which more or less reflects the economic lifetime of 
the investment.  This typically represents the time period within which a capital 
investment will be able to provide a return on the initial investment with normal 
operating and maintenance expenses as a cash outflow.  Electrification projects 
are assessed over a life-cycle of 15 years.  Business improvement projects are 
assessed over a life-cycle of at most 5 years.  The life-cycle of refurbishment 
projects (Assets older than its economic lifetime – normally 25 years) will depend 
on the economic lifetime of the operations of the end users.  If we have a gold 
mine as the end user, for example and the shaft taking electricity will be in 
operation for another 15 years with no prospect of a new shaft that may pick up 
the load, such refurbishment life cycle of the electricity supply will then be limited 
to the 15 years only.  
 
 Operating and maintenance costs.  As mentioned earlier the operating and 
maintenance costs are based on an average rate per tariff class.  This is included 
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Network Charge (Demand based).  Where project alternatives are compared with 
the same load and energy profiles over the life-cycle, the project presenter need 
to make a call whether there will be a difference between the operating and 
maintenance cost profiles of the various alternatives. The FEM model have an 
option on the summary page to include cash flows other than the standard or 
fixed cash elements (Capital, revenue, ops/maintenance) Should any of the 
alternative investment options require either more or less operating and 
maintenance funding over the project life-cycle, this difference can be included in 
the calculations by using the “Cost Saving” facility on the Summary Page. (Just 
enter values with a minus to include it as an expense. For savings enter the 
values as positive entities) 
 
 When the presenter populates the demand and energy data fields over the 
project life-cycle, it would be prudent to allow for market cycles where it is 
possible to determine it with reasonable assurance.  Other possible changes in 
the sales/demand profile during the project’s life-cycle can be considered to 
reflect the customer’s own regular planned maintenance programmes.  
 
 It is acceptable to use the current income stream from the existing customer base 
being fed from a network that’s to be refurbished.  However, it must be noted that 
network refurbishment in most instances will not include the refurbishment of all 
the reticulation lines and transformers to all end users being fed from the network 
being refurbished.  It is therefore recommended to reduce the life-cycle of the 
refurbishment investment to a reduced maximum time period of 15 years only. 
 
 When strengthening projects are presented as investment proposals, the 
presenter will make certain assumptions on the category and number of 
customers that will in future take electricity supply from the network.  The extent 
to which this can be allowed will depend on the capacity limitation that is 
inherently contained in the network configuration.  The following will give some 
illustration of this.  If a substation is extended by the addition of a 20 MVA 
transformer, but the transfer capacity of the line can only accommodate an extra 
15 MVA, then the ‘assumed new load’ cannot exceed 15 MVA.  The proposed 
new load profile growth over the years must be supported by realistic 
assumptions or historical evidence of recent growth patterns.  The philosophy 
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the increased capacity from the network strengthening will be recovered from the 
various individual customers by means of capital charges. 
 
 There are many instances where network refurbishment projects also include a 
strengthening portion.  Our recommendation would be to limit the life-cycle of 
such projects to a maximum of 15 years and to apply the same philosophy in the 
assumptions on new loads.  (Take inherent limits of the network into account 
when assuming additional future loads from new customers or growth from 
existing customers.) 
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